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SEEKING (SOME) CLIMATE JUSTICE IN STATE TORT
LAW
Karen C. Sokol
Abstract: Over the last decade, an increasing number of path-breaking cases have been
filed throughout the world, seeking to hold fossil fuel industry companies and governments
accountable for their actions and inactions that have contributed to the climate crisis. This
Article focuses on an important subset of those cases namely, the recent surge of cases
brought by states, cities, and counties all over the United States alleging that the largest fossil
fuel industry actors, including ExxonMobil, Shell, BP, and Chevron, are liable in state tort law
for harms caused by climate change.
The Article begins with a synthesis of the history of U.S. climate tort litigation, grouping
the cases in o o a es. The c rren s a e or cases are in he second wave and represent
an attempt to avoid the legal pitfalls that plagued the first. The Article then undertakes the first
close e amina ion of he defendan s response o he second-wave climate tort cases; namely,
ha he federal common la of n isance preemp s all he plain iffs s a e or claims.
Unsurprisingly, the issue has divided the courts that have decided it, as the Supreme Court case
law is sparse and unclear. The Article identifies the doctrinal problem in the case law, and then
argues that the only way to bring coherence to the law while adhering to federalism principles
is to disallow preemption of state tort law by federal common law in these cases. Finally, the
Article offers a new perspective on why that is also the right result as a policy matter.
The second-wave climate tort suits are part of a larger global movement of resorting to the
courts to demand climate justice after decades of inaction by policymakers. The current era of
climate disruption and its catastrophic threats demand not only new and improved legal and
policy mechanisms, but also the use of current ones including state tort law to the fullest
extent possible.
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INTRODUCTION
The 450 Inupiat residents of the Native Village of Kivalina, which lies
on the frozen tundra of Alaska along the edge of the Arctic Ocean, are
among the increasing number of communities in the world who are losing
their ability to survive because of climate disruption.1 With temperature
increases that double the global average, Alaska is one of the canaries in
the coal mine of the climate crisis.2 The Arc ic s ice has diminished b
half over the last three decades, triggering a series of reactions that are
transforming the environment.3 The Inupiat risk plunging into frigid
waters whenever they use their snowmobiles the only viable motorized

1. See, for example, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugee s increasingly strong recognition of
the role of climate disruption in refugee movements. Climate Change and Disaster Displacement,
U.N. High Comm r, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/climate-change-and-disasters.html
[https://perma.cc/JCS2-LAY3] ( People are trying to adapt to the changing environment, but many
are being forcibly displaced from their homes by the effects of climate change and disasters, or are
relocating in order to survive. New displacement patterns, and competition over depleted natural
resources can spark conflict between communities or compound pre-existing vulnerabilities. People
displaced across borders in the context of climate change and disasters may in some circumstances
be in need of international protection. Refugee law therefore has an important role to play in
this area. ).
2. Joe McCarthy, How a Tiny Alaska Town Is Leading the Way on Climate Change, HUFFPOST
(Apr. 18, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/how-a-tiny-alaska-town-is-leading-the-wayon-climate_us_58f681d7e4b0c892a4fb7350 [https://perma.cc/RBW6-G8D9].
3. Id.
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means of transportation in the region.4 That, along with the fact that their
principal source of food is the wildlife whose habitats are being destroyed
by rising sea levels, means that the Inupiat communities are losing their
ability to feed themselves.5
The In pia people s home ill e en all s ffer he same fa e as he
wildlife they depend on: according to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
the island on which Kivalina sits will be under water within ten years.6
Life has always been challenging on the frozen tundra, but in the face of
the climate crisis, it is no longer possible. And the federal government has
still not done anything about it.7 Left unprotected by their government, the
Inupiat sued ExxonMobil, BP, Chevron, Shell, and other major fossil fuel
companies for their contribution to the climate crisis.8 The Inupiat claimed
the right to monetary compensation to relocate based on the federal
common law claim of public nuisance.9
Over a decade ago, in 2007, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) noted the likelihood of an increase in cases, such as the
one brought by Kivalina, that are now often referred to as clima e or
clima e j s ice li iga ion.10 The reason for the increase, according to the
IPCC, is ha countries and citizens [will] become dissatisfied with the
pace of international and national decision-making on clima e change. 11
The IPCC was right: A 2019 analysis of climate cases by the Grantham
Research Institute of Climate Change and Environment determined that
4. Id.
5. Melia Robinson, This Remote Alaskan Village Could Disappear Under Water Within 10 Years Here s What Life Is Like There, BUS. INSIDER INDIA (Sept. 27, 2017),
https://www.businessinsider.in/This-remote-Alaskan-village-could-disappear-under-water-within10-years-heres-what-life-is-like-there/articleshow/60858974.cms [https://perma.cc/2ZQ6-2265].
6. Id.
7. Although in 2015 President Obama did submit a proposal to Congress that would have allocated
$400 million for the residents of Kivalina and other Alaskan communities to relocate, Congress never
approved it. Robinson, supra note 5.
8. Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 868 (N.D. Cal. 2009), aff d,
696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012). The village sued a total of twenty-four oil, energy, and utility companies.
Id.
9. Id.
10. See generally, e.g., Chilenye Nwapi, From Responsibility to Cost-Effectiveness to Litigation:
The Evolution of Climate Change Regulation and the Emergence of Climate Justice Litigation, in
CLIMATE JUSTICE: CASE STUDIES IN GLOBAL AND REGIONAL GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES 517, 531
41 (Randall S. Abate ed., 2016) (describing the litigation as a mechanism for seeking clima e j s ice
and referring o i as clima e j s ice li iga ion ).
11. Sangata Gupta et al., 2007: Policies, Instruments and Co-operative Arrangement, in CLIMATE
CHANGE 2007: MITIGATION, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP III TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT
REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 745, 793 (Bert Metz et al. eds.,
2007).
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[c]lima e change li iga ion con in es o e pand across j risdic ions as a
tool to strengthen climate action . . . . 12 As one of the report authors
s a ed, [h]olding go ernmen and b sinesses o acco n for failing o
comba clima e change has become a global phenomenon. 13
In addition to suits against national governments based on international
law, constitutions, and environmental laws, the IPCC pointed to one of
the first climate tort cases brought in the United States: Connecticut v.
American Electric Power Co. (AEP).14 AEP launched what this Article
calls he firs a e of clima e or cases.15 After AEP was filed, an
increasing number of other climate tort cases were filed throughout the
country. This wave of litigation did not end until 2011, when the U.S.
S preme Co r s r ck do n he plain iffs claims in American Electric
Power Co. v. Connecticut (AEP).16 In its wake, the pace of climate tort
filings slowed down to a trickle. Since 2017, however, the pace of filings
has increased dramatically, beginning a second wave. As of this writing,
that wave continues to surge, far surpassing its predecessor in strength
and size.
The clima e or cases in his second a e are e en s ronger han he
first wave for two related reasons. First, these recent claims stand on
robust factual foundations. They are supported by: (1) mounting scientific
evidence for both of the harms caused by climate disruption, and of
specific fossil f el companies con rib ions o clima e change, and
(2) con in ing re ela ions of he de ails of he companies decades-long
knowledge of that evidence and attempts to suppress it with a massive
disinformation campaign. Federal district court Judge William Smith
powerfully summarized the supporting evidence in these cases in his
opinion remanding Rhode Island s second-wave climate tort case back to
12. JOANA SETZER & REBECCA BYRNES, GLOBAL TRENDS IN CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION: 2019
SNAPSHOT 1, 1 (2019).
13. Press Release, Grantham Rsch. Inst. on Climate Change and the Env t, Climate Change
Lawsuits Expand to at Least 28 Countries Around the World, The London Sch. of Econ. & Pol. Sci.
(July 4, 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted), http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/news/
climate-change-lawsuits-expand-to-at-least-28-countries-around-the-world/ [https://perma.cc/E9QS259X].
14. 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y 2005), vacated and remanded, 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009),
rev d, 564 U.S. 410 (2011).
15. The application of this term to the climate tort suits is inspired by Professor Robert Rabin s
effective use of it in his insightful examination and analysis of the long history of litigation against
the tobacco industry. See generally Robert L. Rabin, The Third Wave of Tobacco Tort Litigation, in
REGULATING TOBACCO 176 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2001) (explicating the
tobacco tort cases in terms of three
a es, characterized by the parties strategies and courts
responses to them).
16. 564 U.S. 410 (2011). This decision is explained infra section I.C.
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state court:
Climate change is expensive, and the State wants help paying for
it. Specifically from Defendants in this case, who together have
extracted, advertised, and sold a substantial percentage of the
fossil fuels burned globally since the 1960s. This activity has
released an immense amount of greenhouse gas in o he Ear h s
atmosphere, changing its climate and leading to all kinds of
displacement, death (extinctions, even), and destruction. What is
more, Defendants understood the consequences of their activity
decades ago, when transitioning from fossil fuels to renewable
sources of energy would have saved a world of trouble. But
instead of sounding the alarm, Defendants went out of their way
to becloud the emerging scientific consensus and further delay
changes however existentially necessary that would in any
way interfere with their multibillion-dollar profits. All while
quietly readying their capital for the coming fallout.17
Second, all the second-wave plaintiffs have brought only state tort
claims, and all but one have brought their claims in state courts.18 In the
first wave, most plaintiffs brought federal common law claims in addition
to state claims, and all filed in federal courts. As this Article explains, state
tort law is in many ways much better suited than federal common law for
claims based on doc men a ion of companies disinforma ion campaigns
designed to suppress and obfuscate scientific evidence of harm caused by
their products. And state courts, which have the authority to create and
develop state tort law and regularly decide tort claims, are usually more
adept than federal courts at adjudicating those claims. Thus, the use of
state tort law, together with strong factual foundations, make the secondwave climate tort cases quite powerful.
It is not surprising, then, that the fossil fuel industry defendants are
fighting harder than ever against the cases, attacking them both in court
and in public relations messaging. One of their legal arguments presents
a significant risk that these important and potent state claims will not be
heard: namely, that federal common law of nuisance19 preempts all the
second-wave state tort claims. Defendants then seek to remove the claims,
now transformed into federal common law claims, to federal court, where
they expect to be able to successfully argue for dismissal on the same
17. Rhode Island v. Chevron Corp., 393 F. Supp. 3d 142, 146 (D.R.I. 2019).
18. As of this writing, fourteen cases have been brought. See infra notes 129 138 and
accompanying text.
19. The focus of this Article is the federal common law nuisance claims that are the basis of the
defendants arguments for dismissal of the climate tort claims. It does not address the very different
body of judge-made federal maritime law.
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grounds that brought an end to the first-wave cases: displacement by the
Clean Air Act or justiciability. This Article argues that, as a matter of both
law and policy, this defense should be rejected, and these path-breaking
state climate tort claims allowed to proceed.
This Article adds a few important things to discussions about the
climate tort cases. First, it provides a unique narrative of their history that
c lmina es in a close e amina ion of he fossil f el defendan s defense
strategy that has divided district courts. Second, it identifies the doctrinal
problem in he S preme Co r s case la ha he second-wave defendants
are exploiting with their most recent argument and proposes a way to
resolve the problem. Finally, this Article offers a new perspective on why
allowing the second-wave climate suits to have their day in court is the
right result, not only as a legal matter, but also as a policy matter.
Part I begins with a narrative of the fate of the four first-wave climate
tort cases. None survived motions to dismiss, and this Part organizes the
first- a e cases b he defendan s hree s ccessf l arg men s: (1) the
political question doctrine; (2) lack of Article III standing; and
(3) displacement of federal common law. Part II describes the secondwave climate tor cases and he defendan s la es arg men . Par III
explains the Supreme Court law relevant to that argument. It then argues
that although that law is admittedly sparse and thus unclear, the only way
to bring coherence to the law while adhering to federalism principles is to
reject the possibility that state tort law can ever be preempted by federal
common law alone. Part IV argues that this is also the right result as a
matter of policy. The Article briefly concludes with an explanation of the
significance of the fate of the state climate claims for both tort law and
climate policy in this country.
I.

THE FIRST WAVE OF CLIMATE TORT CASES (2004 TO
2016)

In AEP, a group of states, New York City, and three private land trusts
sued major electric power companies for climate harms, including
significant risks to public lands, infrastructure, and the health of their
residents.20 Because the five defendants were the largest emitters of
carbon dioxide in the United States and together emitted 2.5% of all
anthropogenic emissions on the planet, the plaintiffs argued that the
companies were liable for creating a s bs an ial and nreasonable
interference with public rights nder bo h federal common la and s a e

20. AEP, 564 U.S. at 418.
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tort law.21 The plaintiffs filed their claims in federal court.22
Although the AEP litigation consequently lasted seven years, the case
never went to trial. Nor did any of the other first-wave cases. The fossil
fuel industry defendants succeeded in getting all these cases dismissed on
the pleadings on one or more of three grounds: (1) the political question
doctrine; (2) lack of standing; or (3) displacement of the federal common
law claim. The following three sections explain each, describing each
first-wave case in the process.
A.

The Political Question Doctrine

In three of the first-wave climate cases, the district courts determined
that the cases presented a non-justiciable political question. The
Constitution does not mention poli ical q es ion ; he S preme Co r
developed the doctrine based on separation of powers principles.23 In the
1962 case Baker v. Carr,24 the Supreme Court set out a factor-based test
for determining whether a case raises a political question and is thus nonjusticiable.25 In AEP the district court concluded that one of those factors
was so dominant in the case that it required dismissal on political question
gro nds: he impossibili of deciding i ho an ini ial polic
de ermina ion of a kind clearl for nonj dicial discre ion. 26 No previous
federal common law nuisance case involving pollution, the court
reasoned, o ched on so man areas of na ional and in erna ional polic
presented by the climate case.27 In contrast to previous cases, the court
reasoned, deciding the climate nuisance claim would mean making
decisions about carbon-dio ide le els of he companies emissions ha

21. Id. (citing Brief of the Petitioner at 103 05, 145 47, AEP, 564 U.S. 410 (2011) (No. 10-174)).
22. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co. (AEP), 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), vacated,
582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), rev d, 564 U.S. 410 (2011).
23. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 11 (1962) ( The nonj s iciabili of a poli ical q es ion is
primaril a f nc ion of he separa ion of po ers. ).
24. Id.
25. See id. a 217 ( Prominen on he s rface of an case held o in ol e a poli ical q es ion is
found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discre ion; or he impossibili of a co r s nder aking independen resol ion i ho e pressing
lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
prono ncemen s b ario s depar men s on one q es ion. ).
26. AEP, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 272 (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278 (2004)). All the
factors are listed supra note 25.
27. Id. at 272.
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o ld
req ire[] iden ifica ion and balancing of economic,
en ironmen al, foreign polic , and na ional sec ri in eres s. 28 Thus, the
court held that such decisions were for the political branches and granted
he defendan s mo ion o dismiss.29
Before the Supreme Court issued its decision in AEP, two more firstwave cases were filed California v. General Motors Corp.30 and Native
Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp.31 In both, the district courts
reached the same conclusion as the AEP district court.32 Each of the other
five Baker factors was implicated in the two decisions.
In General Motors, California s A orne General s ed he si larges
motor vehicle manufacturers responsible for 20% of all anthropogenic
U.S. emissions and over 30% of all anthropogenic emissions in
California alleging liability for their contributions to the p blic
n isance of global arming.33 The state brought nuisance claims under
both federal common law and California tort law, and sought damages for
ario s clima e harms, incl ding a decrease in he s a e s a er s ppl
caused by a reduction in snow pack, increased flooding, coastline erosion
caused by sea level rise, and increases in risk and intensity of wildfires.34
The district court in General Motors dismissed the case, agreeing with
the defendants that the federal common law nuisance claim presented the
court with a nonjusticiable political question.35 The court relied heavily
on he dis ric co r s decision in AEP, and its reasoning essentially
racked ha in he firs co r s opinion.36 Because a federal common law
n isance claim req ires he plain iff o demons ra e ha he defendan s
ac i i ies crea ed an unreasonable interference with a right common to
he general p blic, he co r o ld ha e o balance he compe ing
interests of reducing global warming emissions and the interests of

28. Id.
29. Id.
30. No. C06-05755, 2007 WL 2726871 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007).
31. 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009), aff d, 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012).
32. General Motors, 2007 WL 2726871, at *16.
33. Id. at *1. California brought the case against the Big Six motor vehicle manufacturers
General Motors, Toyota, Ford, Honda, Daimler Chrysler, and Nissan. Id.
34. Id. at *1 2. California gets 35% of its water supply from snow pack in the Sierra Nevada region.
Id. at *1.
35. Id. at *16.
36. See id. at *8 (citing the AEP court s reasoning, concluding that although the AEP plaintiffs
sought equitable relief while California sought damages, he same j s iciabili concerns
predomina e and significan l cons rain his Co r s abili
o properl adj dica e he [federal
common la ] claim ).
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ad ancing and preser ing economic and ind s rial de elopmen . 37 Such
balancing, according o he co r , is the type of initial policy
de ermina ion o be made b he poli ical branches rather than the
courts.38 The court went on to point to various congressional and
executive actions and refusals to act on various climate issues at the
national and international levels to support its conclusion that the third
Baker fac or made ha he co r called California s federal common
la global arming n isance or claim non-justiciable.39
The district court found further support for that determination in its
assessment of the first Baker fac or: he her here is a e all
demons rable cons i ional commi men of he iss e o he poli ical
branches.40 The General Motors Court agreed with the defendants that the
federal nuisance claim would sufficiently burden automobile national and
in erna ional marke s o impinge bo h on Congress s po er o reg la e
in ers a e commerce and bo h poli ical branches foreign polic po ers.41
A nuisance claim based on climate disruption, the court reasoned, was no
ordinary tort claim. According o he co r , recogni ing s ch a ne and
unprecedented federal common law nuisance claim for damages would
likel ha e commerce implica ions in o her S a es. 42 Further, the court
concluded that recognizing the nuisance claim would interfere with the
foreign policy decision of the political branches to refuse to commit to
reduction of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions in international
climate negotiations.43
The court also found that its determination that the nuisance claim was
npreceden ed implicated the second Baker factor a lack of
j diciall
disco erable or manageable s andards. 44 Rejecting
California s arg men ha he co r had s fficien federal common la
precedent addressing nuisance claims involving interstate pollution to
equip it o resol e he s a e s n isance claim, he co r concl ded ha
these previous cases were unhelpful because they involved injunctive

37. Id. at *8 (emphasis added) (quoting In re Oswego Barge Corp., 664 F.2d 327, 332 n.5 (2d Cir.
1981)).
38. Id.
39. Id. at *8 13. The court went on to find that the first and second Baker factors also eigh in
favor of he Co r s finding ha Plain iff s claim presen s a non-j s iciable poli ical q es ion. Id. at
*13 15. All the factors are listed in supra note 25.
40. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
41. General Motors, 2007 WL 2726871, at *14.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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relief, rather than damages, and because they did not involve the sort of
complex issues that were presented by a nuisance claim based on
anthropogenic climate disruption.45 According to the court, there was no
a a j dicial s andard co ld be form la ed o decide
ha is an
nreasonable con rib ion o he s m of carbon dio ide in he Ear h s
atmosphere, or . . . who should bear the costs associated with the global
climate change that admittedly result from multiple sources around
the globe. 46
Like the General Motors Court, the Kivalina district court concluded
that the second and third Baker factors required dismissal on political
question grounds.47 The co r s reasoning for each as similar, and
echoed that of both the AEP and General Motors district courts for all the
Baker factors that they assessed: that the federal nuisance claims based on
clima e ere npreceden ed in that they raised myriad issues of the sort
that federal courts were institutionally incapable of addressing.48
Importantly, all three district courts dismissed the cases because their
determination that the federal common law nuisance claim presented a
political question rendered only federal courts without jurisdiction.49
Th s, he co r s did no address he defendan s arg men s agains he
state tort claims, and dismissed the cases without prejudice to refile in
state court.50
California dropped its case,51 but both the AEP and Kivalina plaintiffs
45. Id.
46. Id. at *15.
47. See Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 873 77 (N.D. Cal.
2009), aff d, 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012). Unlike the General Motors Court, the Kivalina district
court concluded that the first Baker factor was not implicated by the federal nuisance claim. Id. at
872 73.
48. See id. at 876 ( Plain iffs global arming n isance claim seeks o impose liabili and damages
on a scale unlike any prior environmental pollution case . . . . Consequently . . . application of the
second Baker fac or precl des j dicial considera ion of Plain iff s federal n isance claim. ); id. at 877
( [T]he alloca ion of fa l and cost of global warming is a matter appropriately left for
de ermina ion b he e ec i e or legisla i e branch in he firs ins ance. ).
49. General Motors, 2007 WL 2726871, at *16.
50. Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 883; General Motors, 2007 WL 2726871, at *16; see Connecticut
v. Am. Elec. Power Co. (AEP), 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 272 74 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (addressing only the
federal nuisance claim), vacated, 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), rev d, 564 U.S. 410 (2011).
51. California initially appealed to the Ninth Circuit, but withdrew its case in June of 2009, citing
recent indications of progress on climate mitigation and adaptation, including the new Obama
administration s policy changes and the EPA s finding that greenhouse gases were pollutants
subject to regulation under the Clean Air Act. See Colum. L. Sch. Sabin Ctr. for Climate Change L.
& Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, Case Documents for California v. General Motors Corp.,
CLIMATE CHANGE LITIG. DATABASE [hereinafter Climate Change Common Law Database],
http://climatecasechart.com/case/california-v-gm-corp/ [https://perma.cc/EXU4-YZQP].
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appealed he dis ric co r s decisions in heir cases. And he
ere
successful in AEP: the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed.52 Emphasizing the limited nature of the political question
doctrine and the highly case-specific nature of the factor-based inquiry,53
the appellate court closely evaluated each of the six Baker factors and
concluded that none of them were sufficiently implicated by the case to
render it non-justiciable.54 According to the court of appeals, the district
co r s anal sis of he hird fac or the impossibili of deciding i ho
an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discre ion failed o acco n for he na re of he plain iffs claim and,
thus, for what it would require a court to decide.55 Because the plaintiffs
alleged specific harms by specific emitters,56 the Second Circuit reasoned,
resolving the case would not require a court to answer questions of
national and international climate policies that must be decided by the
poli ical branches. E en ho gh he claims alleged ha he defendan s
emissions contributed to climate disruption and sought redress for harms
ca sed hereb , he case as s ill an ordinar or s i of the sort that
courts address all the time.57
The defendants made several other arguments for dismissal that the
district court declined to address, all of which the Second Circuit rejected.
The Supreme Court did not, however. As discussed below,58 the Court
reversed the Second Circuit on the ground that the federal common law
nuisance claim was displaced by federal statutory law.
It was based on this decision by the Supreme Court in AEP, rather than
on the political question doctrine, that the Ninth Circuit ultimately
affirmed he dis ric co r s dismissal of Ki alina s case.59 In the
meantime, lower courts continued to dismiss most of the other first-wave

52. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co. (AEP), 582 F.3d 309, 315 (2d Cir. 2009), rev d, 564 U.S.
410 (2011).
53. See id. at 323 (noting that he poli ical q es ion doc rine m s be ca io sl in oked, and that
Baker demands a discrimina ing inq ir in o he precise fac s and pos re of he par ic lar case
before a co r ma i hhold i s o n cons i ional po er o resol e cases and con ro ersies (firs
quoting Can v. United States, 14 F.3d 160, 163 (2d Cir. 1994); and then quoting Lane v. Halliburton,
529 F.3d 548, 558 (5th Cir. 2008)).
54. See id. at 324 32.
55. See id. at 331 (quoting McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 502 F.3d 1331, 1365 (11th Cir.
2007)).
56. See id. at 330 31.
57. Id. at 331 (quoting Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro Ed Altri-Gestione Motonave Achille
Lauro in Amministrazione Straordinaria, 937 F.2d 44, 49 (2d Cir. 1991)).
58. See infra section I.C.
59. Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 858 (9th Cir. 2012).
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cases on the grounds that they presented a non-justiciable political
question or that the plaintiffs lacked standing.
B.

Standing

Because the district courts in AEP and General Motors concluded that
the political question doctrine rendered them without jurisdiction, they
declined o address he defendan s o her arg men s, incl ding ha he
plaintiffs lacked standing.60 The district courts in the two other first-wave
cases Kivalina and Comer v. Murphy Oil USA61 did, however.62 Both
concluded that the plaintiffs did not have standing to bring their claims in
federal court.
The Kivalina district court concluded that federal courts were without
j risdic ion o er he illagers case based on he federal Ar icle III
standing doctrine as well as on the political question doctrine.63 Like the
political question doctrine, federal standing is a constitutional doctrine
based on the separation of powers.64 Also like the political question
doc rine, he s anding doc rine is a prod c of he S preme Co r s
60. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co. (AEP), 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2005),
vacated, 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), rev d, 564 U.S. 410 (2011); General Motors, 2007 WL
2726871, at *16.
61. 585 F.3d 855, 859 (5th Cir. 2009). For the rather remarkable subsequent history of this case,
see infra notes 103 105 and accompanying text.
62. See Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 877 82 (N.D. Cal.
2009), aff d, 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012). There were two other cases in the first-wave period that
brought tort claims for alleged climate harms, but this Article does not include them among the firstwave cases because it focuses only on tort claims that, like those in the second-wave, (1) are brought
against corporate actors whose business activities contribute to climate disruption, and (2) allege only
climate harms. Most cases filed in this time period fit that description (AEP, Comer, General Motors,
and Kivalina), but there are two that do not.
First, Korsinsky v. EPA, No. 05 Civ. 859, 2005 WL 2414744 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2005) was brought
against the EPA rather than a private actor. Id.
Second, in PAWS Holdings, LLC v. Daikin Indus., Ltd., No. CV 116-058, 2017 WL 706624 (S.D.
Ga. Feb. 22, 2017), the plaintiff brought negligence and products liability claims against
manufacturers of heating, ventilation, and air conditioning units, alleging that their products were
defective because they were made of material that permitted leaking of corrosive refrigerant, which
destroyed the units well before the end of their useful life. Id. at *2. The principal injuries that the
plaintiff alleged were monetary losses because of premature product malfunction, and the health and
safety risks posed by exposure to leaked refrigerant. Id. The plaintiff f r her allege[d] ha he ni s
harmed he en ironmen beca se he leaking refrigeran is a greenho se gas ha is ho sands of
times more potent than CO2. Id. This is a very different sort of claim than those brought by all the
other climate tort cases, which alleged only climate harms, and with great detail and specificity as to
how the particular plaintiffs were impacted. See infra Part II (describing the allegations of harm in
the first-wave and second-wave cases).
63. Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 877 82.
64. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
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interpretation of Article III s limi a ion of he federal j diciar s a hori
to deciding cases or controversies.65 The two doctrines are, however,
distinct.66 To establish standing to bring a case, plaintiffs must allege that:
(1) they have suffered an inj r in fac ; (2) the injury is
fairl . . . trace[able] o he defendan s ac ions; and (3) the injury will
likely . . . be redressed by a favorable decision. 67
Plaintiffs, such as the Inupiat, who seek redress for harms to their land
and o her proper easil es ablish he S preme Co r s inj r in fac
requirement of standing. As noted in the introduction, the barrier island is
disappearing, as the sea ice that had protected it from powerful waves
diminishes. Tha is nq es ionabl an ac al, concre e inj r ha is
65. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
66. As noted supra text accompanying notes 10 13, the global surge in climate litigation includes
cases against governments as well as cases against fossil fuel companies, such as the climate tort suits
in the United States. One of the most important climate cases against governments is Juliana v. United
States. 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (D. Or. 2016). In that case, the plaintiffs twenty-one young people and
a climate scientist acting as guardian for future generations asserted that the U.S. Constitution
protects a right to a clima e s s em capable of s s aining h man life. Id. at 1250. The U.S.
government violated that right, they claimed, because, for at least the past half century, in full
knowledge of the grave danger that fossil fuel use and production present to the climate system, it
nevertheless systematically promoted the development of a fossil fuel economy by myriad actions,
incl ding appro ing, promo ing, and s bsidi ing fossil f el e plora ion, e rac ion, prod c ion,
ranspor a ion, impor a ion, e por a ion, and comb s ion. Id. at 1248. The plaintiffs sought
declara or and inj nc i e relief, req es ing ha he co r [o]rder Defendan s o prepare and
implement an enforceable national remedial plan to phase out fossil fuel emissions and draw down
excess atmospheric CO2. Id. at 1247 (quoting First Amended Complaint at ¶94, Juliana, 217 F. Supp.
3d 1224 (No. 6:15 cv 01517 TC)).
District court Judge Ann Aiken agreed that the Constitution protects such a right and denied all of
he go ernmen s mo ions o dismiss. Id. at 1250, 1276. The case never went to trial, however, because
he Nin h Circ i Co r of Appeals agreed o hear he Tr mp Adminis ra ion s e raordinar
ri
seeking interlocutory appeal, and a divided panel dismissed the Juliana case in January of 2020.
Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1165 66, 1175 (9 h Cir. 2020). The panel majori s
ostensible ground for dismissal was that the plaintiffs had failed to establish he redressabili
element of standing. Id. at 1171 72. As Judge Josephine Stanton persuasively argues in a scathing
dissent, however, the majority in effect concluded that the case presented a political question, id. at
1185 86, i ho
nder aking he diffic l b necessar ask of marching p rposef ll hro gh he
Baker fac ors, id. at 1189.
Notwithstanding that Juliana is a constitutional case filed against the federal government in federal
co r , Che ron s a orne filed a le er i h he Nin h Circ i Co r of Appeals arg ing ha Juliana
required dismissal of the climate tort cases currently pending in that court. See Letter from Theodore
J. Boutrous, Jr., Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, to Molly C. Dwyer, Clerk of Ct., U.S. Ct. of Appeals
for the Ninth Cir. (Jan. 29, 2020). Regardless whether the Juliana panel majori s problema ic
opinion remains good law, it is irrelevant to the climate tort cases, which, unlike Juliana, assert only
state claims and seek only damages, and not injunctive relief.
67. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 61 (alteration in original) (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rts. Org.,
426 U.S. 26, 41 42, 38 (1976)). As the Supreme Court has explained, the doctrine of standing is
[o]ne of hose landmarks, se ing apar he Cases and Con ro ersies ha are of he j s iciable sor
referred o in Ar icle III. Id. at 560 (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)).
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par ic lar o he Ki alina illagers, ra her han one ha is h po he ical
or suffered by the public generally.68 Similarly, there is no question that
the relief that Kivalina sought monetary compensation to relocate
would serve to redress that harm.69 However, the Kivalina district court
concluded that the villagers failed to establish the fairl raceable or
ca sa ion
requirement.70
According to the Supreme Court, the causation prong of Article III
standing limits federal jurisdiction to those cases in which the alleged
inj r fairl can be raced o he challenged ac ion of he defendan , and
not injury that results from the independent action of some third party not
before he co r . 71 Although, as the Kivalina court noted, plaintiffs need
not allege facts sufficient to establish proximate causation to establish
causation for purposes of Article III s anding, he m s ins ead sho a
s bs an ial likelihood ha he defendan s cond c ca sed [ he] inj r . 72
The district court concluded that the Kivalina plaintiff failed to do so.
According o he co r , he defendan s cond c ha he plaintiffs
complained of greenhouse gas emissions
as no fairl raceable o
the climate harm of impending displacement faced by the villagers
beca se hose emissions became par of an ndifferen ia ed mass of
greenhouse gases that have been accumulating for cen ries and o
hich a m l i de of so rces other than he Defendan s all o er he
planet contributed.73 Th s, he co r nders ood he Plain iffs claim for
damages [a]s dependent on a series of events far removed both in space
and time from the Defendan s alleged discharge of greenho se gases. 74
S ch an e remel a en a ed ca sa ion scenario, reasoned the court, is
not sufficient to support standing to bring a federal common law nuisance
claim.75 Such a climate claim is different, the court concluded, from the
federal statutory claims at issue in the federal common law cases on which
the plaintiffs relied, including some that involved challenges to discharges
68. Id. a 560 (e plaining ha an inj r in fac is an in asion of a legally protected interest which
is (a) concre e and par ic lari ed, and (b) ac al or imminen , no conjec ral or h po he ical.
(citations omitted) (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990))).
69. Id. a 561 ( [I] m s be likel , as opposed o merel spec la i e, ha he inj r
ill be
redressed b a fa orable decision. (quoting Simon, 426 U.S. at 39)).
70. Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 881 (N.D. Cal. 2009), aff d,
696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012).
71. Simon, 426 U.S. at 41 42.
72. Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 878 (quoting Habecker v. Estes Park, 518 F.3d 1217, 1225 (10th
Cir. 2008)).
73. Id. at 880 81 (emphasis in original).
74. Id. at 881.
75. Id. at 880.
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of pollutants by companies under the Clean Water Act (CWA),76 and one
that involved a challenge o he En ironmen al Pro ec ion Agenc s
(EPA) failure to regulate greenhouse gas emissions under the Clean Air
Act (CAA).77 Although it acknowledged that there were factual
similarities between the causal chain alleged by the village of Kivalina
and those alleged by the plaintiffs in these cases particularly that alleged
in the CAA case the court concluded that the fact that the CWA and
CAA plaintiffs brought claims under federal statutes rather than federal
common law made all the difference for purposes of standing.
In the CWA cases, Congress had set a standard for the amount of
allowable pollutant discharge into waterways, and thus the plaintiffs could
allege that the named defendants exceeded that limit.78 Under those cases,
reasoned the Kivalina district court, such an allegation entitles plaintiffs
to a presumption that the defendant sufficiently contributed to [their]
inj r e en ho gh i ma no be possible o race he inj r o a
par ic lar en i
beca se Congress had de ermined ha e cessi e
discharges were harmful.79 In con ras , here are no federal s andards
limiting the discharge of greenhouse gases, and h s he Kivalina
plaintiffs were unable to sufficiently connect the particular defendant
companies emissions i h heir inj ries.80
Because the CAA case did involve discharge of greenhouse gases, the
court could not distinguish it, as it did for the CWA cases, by pointing to
the existence of a congressional standard serving to link prohibited
conduct with the capacity to harm. In that case, Massachusetts v.
Environmental Protection Agency,81 the Supreme Court held that several
states had standing to sue the EPA for refusing to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions under the CAA.82 Like Ki alina, Massach se s s alleged inj r
was disappearance of its land due to anthropogenic climate disruption.83
76. See id. at 878 82 (first citing Pub. Int. Rsch. Grp. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 913 F.2d
64, 72 (3d Cir. 1990); and then citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp.,
204 F.3d 149, 161 62 (4th Cir. 2000)). In these statutory cases, the plaintiffs brought suit pursuant to
the citizen suit provisions of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1365, and the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7604.
77. See Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 882 (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007)).
78. The Clean Water Act (CWA) establishes the National Pollutant Discharge System to limit
the amount of pollutants that facilities can discharge into waters of the United States. See 33 U.S.C.
§ 1342. Any unauthorized pollutant discharge is unlawful under the CWA. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).
79. Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 879 80 (quoting Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter v. Cedar Point
Oil Co., 73 F.3d 546, 558 (5th Cir. 1996)).
80. Id. at 880.
81. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
82. Id. at 526.
83. Id. at 522.
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Massachusetts made similar factual allegations to those made by Kivalina
regarding the causal link between that injury and the challenged
conduct i.e., he EPA s ref sal o reg la e greenho se gas emissions.84
Ne er heless, he co r dis ing ished Ki alina s case based on he fac
that the claim in Massachusetts was statutory, rather than common law.
Specifically, the court stated that the Kivalina plain iffs ere no seeking
o enforce an proced ral righ s concerning an agenc s r lemaking
a hori , but instead asserted a claim for damages direc ed agains a
arie of pri a e en i ies. 85 Thus, like the CWA cases, the Kivalina
district court concluded that a statutory provision served to somehow
sufficiently link the conduct with the injury for the Massachusetts
plaintiffs to establish the causation requirement of Article III standing.
Curiously, however, the court did not look to the nature of the federal
common law claim, as it did with the statutory claims, to determine
whether the Kivalina plaintiffs had alleged sufficient facts to establish
causation for purposes of standing to bring the sort of claim that they had
brought.86 In contrast, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals did focus on the
na re of he plain iffs or claims in Comer v. Murphy Oil USA,87 and
determined that they had established Article III standing.
In Comer, Mississippi land and property owners sued several oil,
energy, and chemical companies for damage to the Mississippi Gulf Coast
caused by Hurricane Katrina and sea level rise.88 The district court in
84. See id. at 523 26 ( While i ma be r e ha reg la ing mo or-vehicle emissions will not by
itself reverse global warming, it by no means follows that we lack jurisdiction to decide whether EPA
has a duty to take steps to slow or reduce it. . . . The risk of catastrophic harm, though remote, is
ne er heless real. (emphasis in original)).
85. Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 882.
86. Neither did Judge Pro, the district judge sitting on the Ninth Circuit panel that heard Kivalina s
appeal. As noted, because the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court s dismissal of the villagers case
based on the Supreme Court s intervening decision in AEP, holding that the CAA displaced the
federal common law claim in that case, the court declined to address the district court s political
question and standing analyses. See supra text accompanying notes 58 59. Judge Pro, however, did
address standing in a concurring opinion. Because he understood the nature of the federal common
law nuisance claim in the same way as the district court, he agreed with that court that Kivalina did
not meet the causation requirement of the standing doctrine. He concluded that Kivalina had failed to
establish the requisite causal nexus because they neither alleged a specific point in time at which
their injury occurred nor tie[d] it to [the defendants ] activities within this vast time frame in which
global warming has been occurring. Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 868
(9th Cir. 2012). Thus, he reasoned, the villagers could not rely on Massachusetts. See id. at 869 ( It
is one thing to hold that a State has standing to pursue a statutory procedural right granted to it by
Congress in he CAA o challenge he EPA s fail re o reg la e . . . . It is quite another to hold that a
private party has standing to pick and choose amongst all the greenhouse gas emitters throughout
history to hold liable for millions of dollars in damages. ).
87. 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009).
88. Comer, 585 F.3d at 860.
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Comer concluded that the plaintiffs in that climate tort case lacked federal
standing,89 but did not provide the reasons for its decision in a written
opinion.90 The Comer plaintiffs appealed, and the Fifth Circuit panel
reached the opposite conclusion, reversing the district court and
remanding so the plaintiffs could pursue their claims.91 Contrasting the
Fif h Circ i s anal sis of he s anding ca sa ion req iremen i h he
Kivalina district co r s anal sis of ha req iremen for he federal
common law nuisance claim, illustrates the great significance of the
co r s nders anding of he na re of a gi en claim whatever its legal
source to standing analysis.
Like in all the first-wave cases, the plaintiffs in Comer filed their claims
in federal court. Unlike all the other plaintiffs in the first-wave cases,
however, the Mississippi plaintiffs brought only state common law
claims: public and private nuisance, trespass, negligence, fraudulent
misrepresentation, civil conspiracy, and unjust enrichment.92 They alleged
that the defendants were responsible for the damage because their
business operations contributed to climate disruption, which caused
increases in sea level and the severity of the storm.93
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that the district court erroneously
dismissed their p blic and pri a e n isance, respass, and negligence
claims, b
pheld i s dismissal of heir
nj s enrichmen , ci il
conspirac , and fra d len misrepresen a ion claims. 94 Like the Kivalina
plaintiffs, the Comer plain iffs easil sa isfied he inj r in fac
requirement by alleging public and private property damage as well as the
redressabili
req iremen b seeking mone ar compensa ion. Th s,
like the Kivalina defendants, the Comer defendants based their standing
challenge on an argument that the plaintiffs had failed to allege that their
inj ries
ere
fairl
raceable
o he defendan s alleged
tortious conduct.95
As no ed, comparing he Fif h Circ i s anal sis of he s anding
ca sa ion req iremen for he common la claims bro gh b the
Comer plaintiffs, with the Kivalina district co r s anal sis of ha same
requirement for the common law claim, reveals that it is crucial to closely
89. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., No. 1:05 CV 436 LG RHW, 2007 WL 6942285, at *1 (S.D.
Miss. Aug. 30, 2007).
90. In its summary order, the district court noted that it stated its reasoning into the record. Id.
91. Comer, 585 F.3d at 860.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 859.
94. Id. at 879 80.
95. See id. at 863 64.
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inquire into the nature of the claim at issue to properly assess standing. In
contrast to the Kivalina district court which did not even look to the
elements of a federal common law nuisance claim in concluding the
plaintiffs lacked standing the Fifth Circuit panel noted the elements of
each of the Comer plain iffs s a e or la claims in de ermining hether
they had alleged sufficient facts to establish standing causation.96 That
makes sense, as the causal link for any claim regardless of its legal
source is between the alleged unlawful conduct of the defendant and the
alleged harm suffered by the plaintiff. Thus, in the CWA cases, the link
had o be be een discharge of a poll an and harm o he plain iffs
property, and in Massachusetts, be een he EPA s fail re o reg la e
greenhouse gas emissions and loss of land.
The Comer panel noted that in their first set of claims nuisance,
trespass, and negligence the conduct that the plaintiffs alleged was
or io s as he companies greenho se gas emissions.97 The emissions
were a public and private nuisance because they constituted an
unreasonable interference i h he plain iffs se of nearb p blic
property and of their own property; a trespass because they caused
des r c i e and ha ardo s s bs ances o en er he plain iffs proper ; and
negligent because they unreasonably endangered the plaintiffs, the
general p blic, and he en ironmen in iola ion of he companies d
to avoid unreasonably causing harm by conducting their business.98
Beca se i caref ll looked a he na re of he plain iffs or claims in
this way, the Fifth Circuit, in contrast to the Kivalina district court, agreed
with the plaintiffs that, under Massachusetts, they had standing to bring
each of these claims. Indeed, according to the Fifth Circuit, in
Massachusetts the Court accepted a causal chain virtually identical in
part to that alleged by plaintiffs, viz., ha defendan s greenho se gas
emissions contributed to the warming of the environment, including the
ocean s empera re, hich damaged plain iffs coas al Mississippi
property via sea level rise and the increased intensity of Hurricane
Ka rina. 99 In fac , con in ed he co r , he Massachusetts Court
recognized a causal chain extending one step further i.e., that because
96. See id. at 860 61.
97. See id. at 863 ( [T]he . . . public and private nuisance, trespass, and negligence claims[]
all . . . rely on allegations of a causal link between greenhouse gas emissions, global warming, and
he des r c ion of he plain iffs proper b rising sea le els and he added feroci of H rricane
Ka rina. ); see also id. (grouping the unjust enrichment, civil conspiracy, and fraudulent
misrepresen a ion claims oge her beca se he ere all based on plain iffs alleged inj ries ca sed
b defendan s p blic rela ions campaigns and pricing of pe rochemicals ).
98. Id. at 860 61.
99. Id. at 865 (emphasis added).
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the EPA did not regulate greenhouse gas emissions, motor vehicles
emitted more greenhouse gasses than they otherwise would have, thus
contributing to global warming, which injured Massachusetts lands
through sea level rise and increased storm ferocity. 100
Unlike the Kivalina district court, the Fifth Circuit panel did not even
mention the existence of a right to bring an action against the EPA in the
CAA, or any other statutory provision. Rather, its analysis focused on
whether the alleged illegal conduct greenhouse gas emissions was
fairly traceable o he alleged harms o proper , h man heal h, and he
environment. By these lights, as the court noted, the causal link in Comer
was even closer than that accepted by the Court in Massachusetts. The
Fif h Circ i h s held ha he companies argument that standing was
lacking for hese claims as without merit. 101
The Fifth Circuit panel also found that the district court erred in finding
ha he plain iffs n isance, negligence, and respass claims presen ed a
political question, and remanded to the district court.102 The Fifth Circuit
initially granted rehearing en banc,103 but then dismissed the appeal for
lack of a quorum.104 Rather oddly, however, the majority reinstated the
dis ric co r s dismissal and aca ed he panel s decision.105 The Second
Circ i s decision in AEP holding that the plaintiffs had standing and that
their claim did not present a political question was reversed on other
grounds by the Supreme Court, as discussed in the following section.106
As no ed, in ligh of he Co r s AEP decision, the Ninth Circuit in
Kivalina also pheld he dis ric co r s dismissal on displacemen
grounds and declined to address the issues of standing and
political question.

100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 879 80. The court upheld the dismissal of the unjust enrichment, civil conspiracy, and
fraudulent misrepresentation claims on the ground that they lacked pr den ial s anding, a doc rine
related to, but distinct from, Article III standing. See id. at 867 69.
103. See Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 598 F.3d 208, 210 (5th Cir. 2010).
104. See Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 607 F.3d 1049, 1054 55 (5th Cir. 2010).
105. Id. at 1055. Judges Davis, Stewart, and Dennis dissented from the dismissal of the appeal. Id.
at 1055 56. J dge Dennis ro e a leng h opinion dissen ing from ha he called he shockingl
unwarranted actions of ruling that the panel decision has been irrevocably vacated and dismissing the
appeal without adjudicating its merits. Id. at 1056.
106. See discussion infra section I.C. After concluding that the district court erred in finding that
the case presented a political question, see supra section I.A, the Second Circuit rejected the
defendants other arguments for dismissal, including lack of standing and displacement. See
Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co. (AEP), 582 F.3d 309, 332, 349, 387 88 (2d Cir. 2009), rev d,
564 U.S. 410 (2011).
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Displacement of Federal Common Law

Many people have some idea what state tort law is, and, in fact, think
of the common law as state law. That makes sense. After all, federal
common law such as the public nuisance claim in AEP is much more
limited than state common law, both in types of claims and the frequency
with which they are brought. As the Supreme Court has repeatedly
emphasized in the handful of public nuisance cases that it has decided,
federal common la is an unusual exercise of lawmaking by federal
courts. 107 Federal common law is relatively rare for two reasons. First,
state common law is usually more appropriate; only in exceptional cases
involving a handful of interstate issues has the Court required a federal
law of decision to ensure uniformity.108 Second, because this need for a
federal law of decision is the only reason justifying federal common law,
it is appropriate only when Congress has not addressed the issue presented
by the case.109 As the Court has noted, [f]ederal common la is a
necessar e pedien
ha is no longer necessar once Congress has
110
addressed the issue. Th s, Congress need no affirma i el proscribe[]
he se of federal common la ; ra her, he q es ion is he her Congress
has enac ed legisla ion ha addresse[s] or sp[eaks] direc l
o he
issue.111 When Congress has done so, he federal s a e displaces
federal common law.112
In AEP, he S preme Co r held ha ha he plain iffs federal
common law claim was displaced by the CAA.113 The Court reasoned that,
because the plaintiffs so gh aba emen of he defendan s emissions, and
the CAA authorizes the EPA to regulate those emissions, Congress had
sp[oken] direc l
o he iss e.114 Thus, courts had nothing to say about
107. Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. 304, 314 (1981).
108. Id. at 335 36.
109. Id. at 313 14.
110. Id. at 314 (quoting Comm. for Consideration of Jones Falls Sewage Sys. v. Train, 539 F.2d
1006, 1008 (4th Cir. 1976)).
111. Id. at 315.
112. See Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut (AEP), 564 U.S. 410, 423 24 (2011). The doctrine
of displacement applies to federal common law only. The doctrine of preemption, by contrast, applies
to state law only (whether state statutory or common law). For a full explanation of federal preemption
of state law, see infra Part III.
113. Id. at 423 ( [I] is an academic q es ion he her, in he absence of he Clean Air Ac and he
EPA actions the Act authorizes, the plaintiffs could state a federal common-law claim for curtailment
of greenhouse gas emissions because of their contribution to global warming. Any such claim would
be displaced by the federal legislation authorizing EPA to regulate carbon-dioxide emissions. ).
114. Id. a 424. More specificall , he plain iffs so gh inj nc i e relief req iring each defendan
o cap i s carbon dio ide emissions and hen red ce hem b a specified percen age each year for at
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the matter through federal common law, and the Second Circuit
erroneously concluded otherwise.
In reaching its conclusion that the federal nuisance claim in AEP was
not displaced, the Second Circuit acknowledged that the CAA authorized
the EPA to regulate emissions of greenhouse gases.115 However,
according to the court, that authorization alone did not displace a nuisance
claim seeking abatement of those emissions by the defendants, because
the EPA had yet to exercise that authority by issuing regulations.116 Until
and nless he Agenc did so, he co r held he CAA does
not . . . reg la e emissions of he sor ha he plain iffs so gh o aba e
through the federal common law.117
When AEP reached the Supreme Court, the EPA had still not regulated
greenhouse gas emissions. That did not matter, however: in a unanimous
opinion, the Court agreed with the defendants that the legislative
authorization alone meant that Congress had addressed the issue and thus
displaced federal common law.118 Similar to the Kivalina district court in
its standing analysis, the Court did not give more than a cursory reference
to the nature of a federal common law public nuisance claim in reaching
its conclusion that the claim was displaced. Rather, in so holding, the
Co r highligh ed he differen ins i ional capaci ies of e per
administrative agencies such as the EPA and courts.119 The Court

leas a decade. Id. at 419 (quoting Complaint at 110, AEP, 564 U.S. 410 (No. 10-174)).
115. See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co. (AEP), 582 F.3d 309, 378 (2d Cir. 2009) ( Af er
Massachusetts, i is clear ha EPA has s a or a hori o reg la e greenho se gases as a poll an
under the Clean Air Act. ), rev d, 564 U.S. 410 (2011).
116. Id. at 379 80.
117. Id. at 381. The court left open the question whether such a nuisance claim would be displaced
in the event that the EPA did exercise that regulatory authority. Id.
118. See AEP, 564 U.S. at 425 26 ( The critical point is that Congress delegated to EPA the
decision whether and how to regulate carbon-dioxide emissions from powerplants; the delegation is
what displaces federal common law. (emphasis added)); see also id. a 429 ( The Second Circ i
erred . . . in ruling that federal judges may set limits on greenhouse gas emissions in face of a law
empowering EPA to set the same limits . . . . ).
119. See, e.g., id. a 419 ( The [CWA] ins alled an all-encompassing regulatory program,
supervised by an expert administrative agency, to deal comprehensively with interstate water
poll ion. ); id. a 426 ( [W]ere EPA o decline o reg la e carbon-dioxide emissions
altogether . . . the federal courts would have no warrant to employ the federal common law of
n isance o pse he Agenc s e per de ermina ion. ); id. a 427 ( [T]his prescribed order of
decisionmaking the first decider under the [CAA] is the expert administrative agency, the second,
federal judges is yet another reason to resist setting emissions standards by judicial decree under
federal or la . ); id. a 428 ( I is al oge her fi ing ha Congress designa ed an e per agenc , here,
EPA, as best suited to serve as primary regulator of greenhouse gas emissions. The expert agency is
surely better equipped to do the job than individual district judges issuing ad hoc, case-by-case
injunctions. ).
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e plained ha [ ]he appropria e amo n of reg la ion in an par ic lar
greenhouse gas-prod cing sec or req ires comple balancing be een
he en ironmen al benefi po en iall achie able
i h o r Na ion s
energ needs and he possibili of economic disr p ion. 120 This is not a
job ha co r s are eq ipped o do, as he lack he scien ific, economic,
and technological resources an agency can utilize in coping with issues of
his order. 121 But that is what, according to the Court, the federal nuisance
claim o ld ask of co r s, since he
o ld ha e o de ermine, in he
first instance, what amount of carbon-dioxide emissions is
nreasonable. 122 Although a public nuisance under federal common
law is an nreasonable in erference i h a righ common o he general
p blic, 123 the Court did not elaborate on the nature of the judicial inquiry
specific to that common law claim by, for example, drawing on precedent
elaborating on that standard. Instead, the Court just assumed that applying
that standard would parallel that required of the EPA in the exercise of its
CAA authority.
Thus, even if the EPA never regulates carbon dioxide emissions,
federal common law is not available for actions seeking abatement of
greenhouse gas emissions under AEP. However, that leaves open the
question of whether plaintiffs can still bring federal nuisance claims for
damages to compensate for climate harms caused by greenhouse gas
emissions. After all, the CAA does not contain any provisions regarding
damages to remedy harms caused by greenhouse gases or any other air
pollutant. In the Kivalina plain iffs appeal of he dis ric co r s dismissal
of their case, they argued that their nuisance claim was not displaced under
AEP for this reason, as they were seeking compensation, not abatement of
emissions.124 The Ninth Circuit disagreed, concluding that Supreme Court
case la indica ed ha displacemen of a federal common la righ of
ac ion means displacemen of [all] remedies, and h s ha AEP
e ing ished Ki alina s federal common la p blic n isance damage
action, along with the federal common law public nuisance
abatement ac ions. 125

120. Id. at 427.
121. Id. at 428.
122. Id.
123. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(1) (AM. L. INST. 1979).
124. See Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 857 (9th Cir. 2012).
125. Id. In a concurring opinion, Judge Pro, the district judge sitting on the Ninth Circuit panel in
Kivalina, carefully analyzed the relevant Supreme Court case law to highlight the tension . . . on
whether displacement of a claim for injunctive relief necessarily calls for displacement of a damages
claim. Id. at 858. He ultimately agreed that under the best reading of the cases, the majority correctly
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Importantly, the AEP Court made clear that its displacement decision
impacted only the federal common la claim. The Co r h s le[f ] he
matter [of the state tort claims] open for consideration on remand. 126 The
shift to state law and state courts is one of the key distinguishing features
of the second wave of climate tort suits. This makes sense given the fate
of the first-wave suits. In addition to displacement, the other doctrines that
have proven fatal to climate tort suits thus far the political question and
Article III standing doctrines apply only in federal courts. Although
state courts do apply these doctrines, they are based on state constitutions
rather than on the Federal Constitution. Furthermore, state courts have a
much greater familiarity with common law claims because, unlike federal
courts, they adjudicate them regularly. As a result, they are in a much
better position to evaluate grounds for dismissal in light of the specific
nature of the tort claims alleged, rather than focusing on climate disruption
generally, as the first-wave federal district courts did. As explained in
greater detail below,127 for both these reasons, it is less likely that all state
courts will dismiss the second wave of climate suits based on the state
decided that a damages claim was also displaced under AEP. Id. at 866.
126. AEP, 564 U.S. a 429. The plain iffs did no p rs e heir s a e la claims af er he Co r s
decision, ho e er. Beca se he did no allege s a e la claims, he Nin h Circ i s decision ha AEP
required displacement of their federal common law claim brought their case to an end. See Kivalina,
696 F.3d a 858. The co r recogni ed ha i s decision ob io sl does no aid Ki alina, hich i self
is being displaced b he rising sea. Id. B he sol ion o Ki alina s dire circ ms ance, he co r
con in ed, m s res in he hands of he legisla i e and e ec i e branches of o r go ernmen , no
he federal common la . Id. In January of 2020, the Native Village of Kivalina joined four Louisiana
tribes in submitting a complaint to multiple U.N. special rapporteurs, claiming that the U.S.
government is violating its international human rights obligations by failing to address climate
impacts that result in forced displacement. See THE ALASKA INST. FOR JUST., RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS
PEOPLE IN ADDRESSING CLIMATE-FORCED DISPLACEMENT 3 (2020). The tribes allege:
The United States government has known for decades that changes to the environment caused
by the effects of climate change, as well as human-made disasters, threaten these coastal Tribal
Nations in Alaska and Louisiana. Among these threats include rising sea levels, catastrophic
storms, and unchecked extraction of oil and gas. When these threats impact citizens of these
Tribal Nations, the government has failed to allocate funds, technical assistance and other
reso rces o s ppor he Tribes righ o self-determination to implement community-led
adaptation efforts that effectively protect the lives and livelihoods of Tribal citizens [sic] The
governmen s inac ion has gone be ond basic negligence here he go ernmen has failed o
engage, consult, acknowledge and promote the self-determination of these Tribes as they identify
and develop adaptation strategies, including resettlement [sic]. By failing to act, the U.S.
government has placed these Tribes at existential risk.
Id. a 9. The ask he Special Rappor e rs o find ha clima e-forced displacement is a human rights
crisis and o make a n mber of recommenda ions o he U.S. go ernmen , incl ding [r]ecogni [ing]
the self-de ermina ion and inheren so ereign of all of he Tribes, es ablishing a reloca ion
institutional framework that is based in human rights protections to adequately respond to the threats
facing Tribal Nations, including the rapid provision of resources for adaptation efforts that protect the
right to culture, health, safe-drinking a er, food, and adeq a e ho sing, and f nding he ribal-led
reloca ion process for he Alaska Na i e Village of Ki alina. Id. at 10 11.
127. See infra Part II.
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versions of either doctrine.
It thus makes sense that, rather than making these arguments in state
courts, the defendants in the second-wave climate tort suits are arguing
that all of the state claims are preempted by federal common law, and then
attempting to remove them to federal court. If they are successful in this
defense strategy, there is a significant chance that the second wave will
suffer the same fate as its predecessor.128 The next Part describes this
second wave of climate tort suits and the principal defense strategy to
defea hem: namel , o federali e he s a e claims.
II.

THE SECOND WAVE OF CLIMATE TORT CASES (2017 TO
PRESENT)

The first wave of climate tort cases ended wi h he S preme Co r s
displacement decision in AEP and he Nin h Circ i s e ension of i o
damages claims in Kivalina in 2012. The waters remained still for the next
five years.129 But beginning in the summer of 2017, the pace of climate
tort filings increased dramatically. In contrast to most of the first-wave
cases, these recent plaintiffs are bringing only state claims. And, unlike all
of the first-wave cases, all except one in the second wave have filed in
state court, rather than federal.
Beginning in July of 2017, several cities and counties, one state, and,
most recently, a commercial fishing industry trade group, have filed state
tort claims seeking compensation from fossil fuel industry defendants for
current and future damages to infrastructure, land and other natural
reso rces, residen s heal h and proper , and li elihoods.130 Within just
three years, the number of second-wave climate tort cases filed is now
four times the total number of first-wave cases filed in the previous

128. Indeed, all the district courts that heard the first-wave cases held that one or both doctrines
barred the suits. See supra sections I.A, I.B. Further, it bears mention that in AEP, four Justices
o ld [ha e] h[e]ld ha none of he plain iffs ha[d] Ar icle III standing. 564 U.S. at 420. Because
Justice Sotomayor did not participate in the decision, the Court affirmed the Second Circuit s decision
finding Article III standing and reversed its decision finding that the claim was not displaced by the
CAA. Id. at 420, 429.
129. A chronological listing of filings with links to court documents of all U.S. common law
climate actions is available at Climate Change Common Law Database, supra note 51, at
http://climatecasechart.com/case-category/common-law-claims/ [https://perma.cc/292K-AAA9].
The site is also an excellent resource on all types of climate litigation in the United States and in rest
of the world. See id. PAWS Holdings was filed in 2016, but I do not include it among climate tort
cases for purposes of this Article because the principal harms alleged were not related to climate
disruption. See supra note 62.
130. See Climate Change Common Law Database, supra note 51.
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twelve years.131
From July of 2017 through the end of the year, several California
counties and cities sued Chevron, ExxonMobil, Shell, and other major
fossil fuel producers in state courts for current and future damage to
homes and infrastructure caused by climate change induced sea level
rise.132 New York City then brought the first second-wave suit of 2018,
and the only one filed in federal court, suing the five largest fossil fuel
producers for damages for various climate injuries, including more intense
heat waves, extreme precipitation, and sea level rise.133 Next, the city of
Boulder and two counties sued Suncor Energy and ExxonMobil in
Colorado state courts, the first climate tort case brought by communities
living in an interior, non-coastal region of the United States.134 A month
later, in May of 2018, King County filed suit in Washington state court
against BP and five other companies, alleging similar climate harms to
those alleged by California coastal communities, as well as the threat
presented by ocean acidification to he region s significan shellfish
industry.135 In July, Rhode Island became the first state plaintiff of these
second-wave cases, filing suit against several companies.136 Later in the
month, Baltimore filed suit in Maryland state court against twenty-six
fossil fuel companies.137 A few months later, the Pacific Coast Federation
of Fishermen s Associa ions the largest commercial fishing industry
trade group on the west coast filed s i seek[ing] o hold se eral
companies acco n able for ac e changes o he ocean off of California
and Oregon that resulted, over the last three years, in prolonged regulatory
closures of the Dungeness crab fisheries the most lucrative and reliable
fisheries on the west coast. 138
131. Four cases were filed in the first wave, see supra Part I, and, thus far, sixteen cases have been
filed since July of 2017. See Climate Change Common Law Database, supra note 51.
132. See Climate Change Common Law Database, supra note 51. Summaries of each case are
provided in the California entries in Climate Change Common Law Database. Id.
133. See Complaint, City of N.Y. v. BP P.L.C., No. 18-CV-182 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2018). The city
alleged that the defendants were together responsible for over 11% of all the carbon and methane
pollution from industrial sources that has accumulated in the atmosphere since the dawn of the
Industrial Revolution. Id. at 2.
134. See Amended Complaint and Jury Demand, Cnty. Comm rs v. Suncor Energy, Inc.,
No. 2018CV30349 (Colo. Dist. Ct. June 11, 2018) [hereinafter Boulder Complaint].
135. See Complaint, King Cnty. v. BP P.L.C., No. 18-2-11859-0 (Wash. Super. Ct. May 9, 2018).
King County includes Seattle and Bellevue.
136. See Complaint, Rhode Island v. Chevron Corp., No. PC-2018-4716 (R.I. Super. Ct. July 2,
2018) [hereinafter Rhode Island Complaint].
137. See Plaintiff s Complaint, Mayor of Balt. v. BP P.L.C., No. 24-C-18-004219 (Md. Cir. Ct.
July 20, 2018).
138. See Complaint ¶ 1, Pac. Coast Fed n. of Fishermen s Ass ns v. Chevron Corp., No. CGC-18-
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The first case of 2020 was filed by the city and county of Honolulu
against Sunoco, ExxonMobil, Chevron, BP, Shell, ConocoPhillips, and
other major oil and gas companies. Honolulu is seeking damages for
myriad climate harms, including bleaching of coral reefs, loss of marine
life and several bird species unique to the region, flooding from sea level
rise and more intense weather events, heatwaves, drought, and corrosion
of the water mains of its drinking supply system from seawater
intrusion.139 Honol l s clima e case is par ic larl impor an since, as he
onl island s a e, Ha ai i is par ic larl
lnerable o he clima e crisis.140
Finally, the most recent filing as of this writing was by Minnesota, the
second state to file a climate tort suit.141 Minneso a s case is he firs o
name the American Petroleum Institute, the major industry trade
association of which the defendants in all the cases are members and the
actions of which are extensively documented in all the complaints.142
Minneso a s complain is also no able beca se i highligh s he
disproportiona e impac of he clima e crisis on he s a e s mos lnerable
571285 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 14, 2018) [hereinafter Fishermen s Complaint].
139. See Complaint ¶¶ 149 52, City of Honolulu v. Sunoco LP, No. 1CCV-20-0000380 (Haw. Cir.
Ct. Mar. 9, 2020) [hereinafter Honolulu Complaint]. The Mayor of Maui County has also announced
his intention to bring suit against fossil fuel companies. See Press Release, Cnty. of Maui Pub. Info.
Off., Maui County to Hold Fossil Fuel Companies Accountable for Costs &
Consequences of Climate Change (Oct. 29, 2019), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/
6785849-Maui-Press-Release-Climate-Change-Lawsuit-10-29-19.html [https://perma.cc/W7U657MF].
140. The most recent National Climate Assessment report details how Hawai i and U.S. affiliated
Pacific Islands (i.e., the Northern Mariana Islands, Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, Palau,
American Samoa, and Guam) are at risk from climate changes that will affect nearly every aspect of
life. Jo-Ann Leong et al., Ha ai i a d U.S. Affi ia ed Pacific I a d , in CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS
IN
THE
UNITED STATES 537, 538 (Jerry M. Melillo et al. eds., 2014),
https://nca2014.globalchange.gov/downloads [https://perma.cc/7LZR-N63G]. As a later report also
details, the U.S. island territories of Puerto Rico and the U.S Virgin Islands face similar climate risks
o food sec ri , he econom , c l re, and ecos s ems ser ices. William A. Go ld e al., U.S.
Caribbean, in 2 IMPACTS, RISKS, AND ADAPTATION IN THE UNITED STATES: FOURTH NATIONAL
CLIMATE ASSESSMENT 809, 816 (David R. Reidmiller et al. eds., 2018),
https://nca2018.globalchange.gov/downloads/NCA4_Ch20_US-Caribbean_Full.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y9QH-GDND]. Indeed, a recent report assessing levels of exposure and
vulnerability to extreme weather events all over the world concluded that Puerto Rico was one of the
hree co n ries and erri ories mos affec ed b e reme ea her e en s in he period from 1999 o
2018, along with Myanmar and Haiti. DAVID ECKSTEIN ET AL., GLOBAL CLIMATE RISK INDEX 2020,
at 4, 9 (Joanne Chapman-Rose & Janina Longwitz eds., 2019), https://germanwatch.org/sites/
germanwatch.org/files/20-2-01e%20Global%20Climate%20Risk%20Index%202020_10.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4XDP-UGUF].
141. See Complaint, Minnesota v. Am. Petroleum Inst., No. 62-CV-20-3837 (Minn. Dist. Ct. June
24, 2020) [hereinafter Minnesota Complaint], https://www.ag.state.mn.us/Office/Communications/
2020/docs/ExxonKochAPI_Complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/BQZ8-5LLM].
142. Id. ¶¶ 13 16.
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residents, including communities of color, those living in poverty, the
elderly, and children.143 It alleges health effects from increasing
heatwaves, wildfires, air pollution, and flooding. 144 Indeed, the
complain s opening paragraph s a es: Warming will continue with
devastating economic and public-health consequences across the state
and, in particular, disproportionately impact people living in poverty and
people of color. 145
As noted, all of these second-wave plaintiffs have brought only state
or claims. In response, all of he defendan s are seeking o federali e
the state claims of the second-wave climate suits by arguing that federal
common law preempts them. Also as noted, for the first time, the plaintiffs
in most of the second-wave cases filed in state courts (all but one).146 In
all of those cases, the defendants have also filed notices of removal to
federal court on the ground that federal common law preemption of the
state claims provides federal courts with subject matter jurisdiction under
the federal-question statute.147
These second-wave cases have understandably garnered significant
attention because they rely on even more robust evidence than those of
the first wave and are using potentially powerful litigation strategies.
Sections A and B address each in turn. The final section of this Part
e plains he defendan s a emp o federali e he s a e claims so he can
resort to the same or similar arguments that were successful in getting
federal courts to dismiss the first-wave suits.
A.

S
g E ide ce f Defe da
Re
ibi i f C i a e Ha ,
Knowledge Thereof, and Disinformation Campaign to Suppress It

Since he S preme Co r s AEP decision put an end to the first-wave
cases, the evidence that anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions have
disr p ed he plane s clima e s s em, and hereb
reaked m riad
catastrophic harms at an ever-increasing pace, has steadily
143. See id. at 67.
144. Id. ¶¶ 159, 161.
145. Id. ¶ 1. In his press release anno ncing he s a e s s i , Minneso a A orne General Kei h
Ellison s a ed: Impac s from clima e change h r o r lo -income residents and communities of color
first and worst. Press Release, Off. of Minn. Att y Gen. Keith Ellison, AG Ellison Sues ExxonMobil,
Koch Industries & American Petroleum Institute for Deceiving, Defrauding Minnesotans About
Climate Change (June 24, 2020), https://www.ag.state.mn.us/Office/Communications/2020/06/24_
ExxonKochAPI.asp [https://perma.cc/4JJC-SCQD].
146. See supra text accompanying note 131.
147. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 ( The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising
nder he Cons i ion, la s, or rea ies of he Uni ed S a es. ).
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strengthened.148 The complaints filed by the second-wave climate tort
plaintiffs lay out this scientific evidence in great, sobering detail. In
addition to strong evidence of the causal links between anthropogenic
greenhouse gas emissions and climate impacts such as sea level rise,
wildfires, and more intense storms, the plaintiffs present two timelines
alongside each other to striking effect. First, [ ]he s bs an ial majori of
all greenhouse gas emissions in history has occurred since the 1950s, a
period kno n as he Grea Accelera ion. 149 Second, the complaints set
for h e ensi e doc men ar e idence ha ano her accelera ion ook
place over the same period of time: namely, the fossil fuel industry
became increasingly aware that their products were contributing to the
dangerous transformation of the plane s clima e. In he 1950s, he
companies and the American Petroleum Institute (API), the trade
association of which all the major fossil fuel companies are members,
began putting significant funding into research on the changes in the
climate systems that would be caused by continued anthropogenic
emissions of greenhouse gases and the consequences for people and the

148. See, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014:
SYNTHESIS REPORT 40 (Rajendra K. Pachauri & Leo A. Meyer eds., 2015),
https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/05/SYR_AR5_FINAL_full_wcover.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VD33-3VBG] ( H man infl ence on he clima e s s em is clear, and recen
anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases are the highest in history. Recent climate changes have
had idespread impac s on h man and na ral s s ems. ).
The evidence for human influence on the climate system has grown since [the 2007 Synthesis
Report]. Human influence has been detected in warming of the atmosphere and the ocean, in
changes in the global water cycle, in reductions in snow and ice, and in global mean sea level
rise; and it is extremely likely to have been the dominant cause of the observed warming since
the mid-20th century. In recent decades, changes in climate have caused impacts on natural and
human systems on all continents and across the oceans. Impacts are due to observed climate
change, irrespective of its cause, indicating the sensitivity of natural and human systems to
changing climate.
Id. at 47 (emphasis in original).
149. See Complaint ¶ 4, City of Imperial Beach v. Chevron Corp., No. C17-01227 (Cal. Super. Ct.
July 17, 2017) [hereinafter San Mateo Complaint] (quoting Will Steffen et al., The Trajectory of the
Anthropocene: The Great Acceleration, 2 ANTHROPOCENE REV. 81 (2015)) (Imperial Beach s and
Marin County s cases were consolidated with San Mateo s when removed to federal court). The
Great Acceleration was coined by a group of scientists working with the International GeosphereBiosphere Programme. See Great Acceleration, INT L GEOSPHERE-BIOSPHERE PROGRAMME,
http://www.igbp.net/globalchange/greatacceleration.4.1b8ae20512db692f2a680001630.html
[https://perma.cc/H4TC-5CCV]. In 2015, they published graphs showing socio-economic and Earth
System trends from 1750 to 2000. See Steffen et al., supra. To evaluate the rate and magnitude of
human-dri en change compared o na ral ariabili , he assess he increase in atmospheric carbon
dioxide levels over time. Great Acceleration, supra. Based on hese findings, he concl ded: Onl
beyond the mid-20th century is there clear evidence for fundamental shifts in the state and functioning
of the Earth System that are beyond [previous] range of variability . . . and driven by human
ac i i ies. S effen e al., supra.
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planet.150 The level of accuracy in the predictions of the various research
reports over the years is striking. For example, the complaints quote from
a series of reports by Stanford Research Institute scientists that the API
received and distributed to its members in the late 1960s.151 The scientists
s a ed ha b he ear 2000, [s]ignifican empera re changes are almos
cer ain o occ r, and ha he po en ial damage o o r en ironmen co ld
be se ere, incl ding he mel ing of he An arc ic ice cap. 152 The report
f r her s a ed ha b he same ear a mospheric CO2 concentrations
o ld reach 370 ppm. 153 As Honol l s complain no es, ha is almos
e ac l
ha i rned o o be (369 ppm). 154 Wha as missing, he
scien is s said, as ork on air poll ion echnolog and . . . systems in
which CO2 emissions o ld be bro gh nder con rol. 155 Similarly, a
1979 Exxon internal memorandum stated that limiting the CO2
concen ra ion in he a mosphere o ha as ass med o be a rela i el
safe le el for he en ironmen
o ld req ire [e]igh percen of fossil
fuel resources . . . to be left in the gro nd, minimal se of fossil f els
such as shale oil, and rapid deployment of carbon-free energy systems.156
In response, instead of taking measures to change their business
activities to mitigate their consequences, the companies accelerated those
activities, protected their infrastructure from the climate impacts they
knew were coming, and mounted a concerted disinformation campaign to
create doubt about the impact of fossil fuel products on the planet. For
example, as late as the 1990s, the API created a public-relations front
gro p ( he Global Clima e Science Comm nica ions Team ) hose
stated mission as con incing [a] majori of he American p blic o
recogni e[ ] ha significan ncer ain ies e is in clima e science. 157 The
goal of this disinformation campaign was to ensure that the climate crisis
o ld be a non-issue, meaning that the Kyoto Protocol is defeated and
150. See, e.g., Honolulu Complaint, supra note 139, ¶ 48 ( In 1954, geochemis Harrison Bro n
and his colleagues at the California Institute of Technology wrote to the American Petroleum Institute,
informing the trade association that preliminary measurements of natural archives of carbon in tree
rings indicated that fossil fuels had caused atmospheric carbon dioxide levels to increase by about 5%
since 1840. The American Petroleum Institute funded the scientists for various research projects, and
measurements of carbon dioxide continued for at least one year and possibly longer, although the
res l s ere ne er p blished or o her ise made a ailable o he p blic. ).
151. Id. ¶ 55.
152. Id.
153. Id. ¶ 56.
154. Id.
155. Id. ¶ 55.
156. Id. ¶ 61.
157. See Boulder Complaint, supra note 134, ¶¶ 426 27.
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here are no f r her ini ia i es o h ar he hrea of clima e change. 158
The San Mateo complaint powerfully summarizes the
damning evidence:
Defendan s a areness of he nega i e implica ions of heir o n
behavior corresponds almost exactly with the Great Acceleration,
and with skyrocketing greenhouse gas emissions. With that
knowledge, Defendants took steps to protect their own assets
from these threats through immense internal investment in
research, infrastructure improvements, and plans to exploit new
opportunities in a warming world. . . . Defendants concealed the
dangers, sought to undermine public support for greenhouse gas
regulation, and engaged in massive campaigns to promote the
ever-increasing use of their products at ever greater volumes.159
The degree of he companies accelera ion of heir fossil f el
e ploi a ion is as o nding: The ha e e rac ed from he ear h eno gh
fossil fuel materials (i.e., crude oil, coal, and natural gas) to account for
more than one in every five tons of CO2 and methane emitted
orld ide. 160 At the same time, they ensured that there would be a
demand for their products notwithstanding the dangerous consequences
ih
rongf l promo ion and marke ing ac i i ies. 161 As a result, the
complain alleges, he defendan s bear a dominan responsibili for
global arming generall and for Plain iffs inj ries in par ic lar. 162
This dual-pronged strategy of aggressively marketing products to
create fossil-fuel dependent societies, coupled with massive and
systematic disinformation campaigns to counter and obfuscate the
catastrophic dangers of use of those products, has been so effective that
we are now at the point where the problem can no longer be addressed
merely by mitigation of emissions. Instead, we are experiencing and will
continue to experience climate harms that must be adapted to and
redressed.163 In a previous article I discussed a similar strategy, which I
158. Id. ¶ 427. The Kyoto Protocol is one of the key international climate agreements.
159. San Mateo Complaint, supra note 149, ¶¶ 6 7.
160. Id. ¶ 14.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. The United Nations Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty & Human Rights concluded in a
recent report:
[T]he scale of change required to limit warming to 1.5°C is historically unprecedented and c[an]
onl be achie ed hro gh socie al ransforma ion and ambi io s emissions red c ion meas res.
Even 1.5°C of warming an unrealistic, best-case scenario will lead to extreme temperatures
in many regions and leave disadvantaged populations with food insecurity, lost incomes and
livelihoods, and worse health. As many as 500 million people will be exposed and vulnerable to
water stress, 36 million people could see lower crop yields and up to 4.5 billion people could be
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called a s ra eg of disinforma ion pl s pa h-dependence, sed b he
tobacco industry to continue selling its products in the face of mounting
evidence of their deadly nature.164 The second-wave complaints make
clear that there is now sufficient evidence to show that the fossil fuel
industry was engaging in this strategy at around the same time that the
tobacco industry was. That is perhaps not surprising considering that, as
the complaints also lay out, many of the same people worked on
effectuating the strategy for both industries.165 For example, the API and
Exxon funded and promoted the work of two physicists Fred Seitz and
Fred Singer who had previously worked for the tobacco industry to cast
doubt on the scientific evidence establishing the dangers of tobacco
product use.166 In heir book de ailing bo h ind s ries disinforma ion
campaigns designed to suppress and distort science, historians Naomi
Oreskes and Erik Conway explain how, in the 1980s and early 1990s,
Singer attempted to counter the work of climate scientists on humaninduced global warming by associating calls for environmental
protections to fears of the Soviet Union and communism then fueled by
the Cold War. Oreskes and Conway quote from an essay that Singer wrote
in 1991 stating ha [ ]he real agenda of en ironmen alis s and the
scientists who provided data on which they relied was to destroy
capitalism and replace it with some sort of worldwide utopian
Socialism or perhaps Comm nism. 167
It bears emphasis that the second-wave plain iffs allega ions of hese
d al accelera ion imelines are s ppor ed b e ensi e doc men ar
evidence in their complaints; none of the cases have even reached
discovery yet. And, given their promising new litigation strategies, some
exposed to heat waves. In all of these scenarios, the worst affected are the least well-off members
of society.
Philip Alston (Special Rapporteur), Climate Change and Poverty, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/41/39 (July
17, 2019).
164. See Karen C. Sokol, Smoking Abroad and Smokeless at Home: Holding the Tobacco Industry
Accountable in a New Era, 13 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL Y 81, 94 102 (2010) (describing the
disinforma ion pl s pa h-dependence s ra eg as consis ing of (1) the pervasive dissemination of
disinformation to encourage nonrational decisionmaking about tobacco product use, and (2) the
subsequent deprivation of free choice on the part of those who become addicted to the products, even
if he disinforma ion problem is correc ed ).
165. See Boulder Complaint, supra note 134, ¶ 430.
166. See id.; see also NAOMI ORESKES & ERIK M. CONWAY, MERCHANTS OF DOUBT 5, 35 (2010)
(de ailing Sei s and Singer s ork for he obacco ind s r helping o cas do b on he scien ific
e idence linking smoking o dea h and heir s bseq en ork for fossil-fuel industry actors to
undermine the scientific evidence linking anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions to
global warming).
167. ORESKES & CONWAY, supra note 166, at 134.
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may very well proceed to discovery, which will undoubtedly lead to even
more evidence.
B.

Avoiding the Pitfalls of the First Wave: New Litigation Strategies

The second-wave cases have made two primary changes in litigation
strategy: (1) bringing only state tort claims, mostly in state court, and
(2) basing the claims on the marketing of fossil fuel products, rather than
on emission of greenhouse gases.
Bringing only state claims makes dismissal on all three of the federal
separation of powers grounds detailed in Part I much less likely. First,
state claims cannot be displaced by the Clean Air Act, as displacement is
a doctrine applicable only to federal common law. Indeed, as noted, in
AEP the Supreme Court dismissed the federal nuisance claims on
displacement grounds and indicated that the plaintiffs could refile their
state claims in state court.168 State common law can be preempted by
federal law, but, as discussed below, that is a different doctrine that has
yet to be addressed in the context of climate tort claims.
Further, although the standing and political question doctrines may still
pose obstacles, state courts have their own standing and political question
doctrines that differ from their federal counterparts in ways that could
make them less likely to pose an obstacle to climate tort claims.169
Importantly, many state courts have more relaxed standing requirements
than those imposed at the federal level.170 And, even in cases in which
168. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
169. See Tracy Hester, Climate Tort Federalism, 13 FLA. INT L L. REV. 79, 85 86 (2018) ( [T]he
s i ch o s a e la claims i hin a s a e co r s s em (or a federal co r s di ersi j risdic ion)
potentially sidesteps the most troublesome barriers that bedeviled federal common law tort climate
claims. . . . Because state courts generally operate as courts of general jurisdiction, they avoid the
deeply rooted limits woven into federal judicial powers as courts of limited jurisdiction subject to
separa ion of po ers cons rain s and Ar icle III e al limi a ions. ); see also Nat Stern, The Political
Question Doctrine in State Courts, 35 S.C. L. REV. 405, 406 07 (1984) ( Despite th[e] absence of
serious evolution in Supreme Court opinions [on the political question doctrine since Baker v. Carr],
the idea of political questions has not escaped judicial attention entirely. The supreme courts of the
states . . . have continued to address the notion of inherently nonjusticiable issues and have formulated
heir o n poli ical q es ion doc rines. ).
170. See Hester, supra note 169. As the Fifth Circuit panel noted in Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, for
e ample: Beca se Mississippi s Cons i ion does no limi he j dicial po er o cases or
controversies, its courts have been more permissive than federal courts in granting standing to
par ies, finding s anding o s e hen [par ies] asser a colorable in eres in he s bjec ma er of
the litigation or experience an adverse effect from the conduct of the defendant, or as otherwise
pro ided b la . 585 F.3d 855, 862 (5 h Cir. 2009) (q o ing State v. Quitman Cnty., 807 So. 2d
401, 405 (Miss. 2001)). Under ha s andard, he panel concl ded, he Plain iffs claims easil sa isf
Mississippi s liberal s anding req iremen s. Id. (quoting Van Slyke v. Bd. of Tr. of State Insts. of
Higher Learning (Van Slyke II), 613 So. 2d 872, 875 (Miss. 1993)).
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state standing and political question analyses are similar to their federal
counterparts, it is possible that state courts would assess their respective
s a es or la differen l han a federal co r
o ld nder hese
doctrines. After all, as discussed further below,171 state courts regularly
adjudicate tort claims and contribute to tort la s e ol ion, and h s in
all likelihood ill kno
he s a e s or la and i s dis inc i e
jurisprudential nature much better than a federal court sitting in diversity
jurisdiction would.
The distinctive nature of state tort claims is particularly important
where, as here, the law governing the claims is much richer than that
governing the federal common law nuisance claims brought by the firstwave plaintiffs. This relates to the second change in litigation strategy that
makes the second-wave claims so potentially powerful i.e., basing them
on he companies marke ing of fossil f el prod c s, ra her han on heir
emission of greenhouse gases.
The focus on the marketing of fossil fuel products is important for two
reasons. First, it makes it less likely that a court will determine that the
claims are preempted by the Clean Air Act, which regulates emissions of
greenhouse gases and other pollutants but does not address the marketing
of fossil fuel products.172 Because those claims were never refiled,
however, the question of whether those claims were preempted by the
CAA was never raised. The defendants in the second wave will
unquestionably raise the issue however, and the plaintiffs will be able to
respond by emphasizing that the focus on marketing distinguishes their
claims from the federal common law claims that the Court dismissed in
AEP. F r her, he CAA has a sa ings cla se ha e plici l preser es
common law claims.173 The Supreme Court has relied on a similar
provision in the Clean Water Act to hold that the CWA does not preempt
certain state tort actions.174
Second, here is a s rong arg men ha foc sing on he companies
marketing practices better captures the wrongful nature of the conduct that
caused the climate harms. Importantly, state tort law is much better
equipped to handle claims regarding wrongful marketing of products than
federal common law. Indeed, there is no federal common law precedent
addressing product marketing. Rather, the relatively small number of
Supreme Court cases applying the federal common law of nuisance
171. See infra Part IV.
172. Preemption doctrine and its relevance to the climate tort litigation is discussed further infra
Part III.
173. See 42 U.S.C. § 7604(e).
174. See infra text accompanying notes 235 240.
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involve interstate pollution.175 In contrast, the state tort law of nuisance is
much broader. In some states, courts have recognized its applicability in
cases seeking to hold manufacturers accountable for their wrongful
marketing of products, including manufacturers of lead paint,176 guns,177
and opioids.178
All of the second-wave plaintiffs except Minnesota have brought state
nuisance claims. Minnesota179 and the plaintiffs in four of the other
175. See infra Part III.
176. See People v. ConAgra Grocery Prods. Co., 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d 499 (2017) (upholding a
judgment that lead paint manufacturers were liable under the doctrine of public nuisance for
knowingly manufacturing and marketing lead paint for indoor use notwithstanding their knowledge
of its dangers to human health before the federal government banned its use in homes in the 1950s).
Other jurisdictions have, however, held that lead paint manufacturers could not be held liable under
their public nuisance doctrines. See, e.g., S a e . Lead Ind s. Ass n., 951 A.2d 428, 453 54 (R.I.
2008) (holding ha , beca se [ ]he righ of an indi id al child no o be poisoned b lead pain
is . . . similar o o her e amples of nonp blic righ s, he s a e had failed to allege the requisite
in erference i h a p blic righ , hich is reser ed more appropria el for hose indi isible reso rces
shared b he p blic a large, s ch as air, a er, or p blic righ s of a , and does no e end o a
widespread interference i h he pri a e righ s of n mero s indi id als ); In re Lead Paint Litig., 924
A.2d 484, 501 02 (N.J. 2007) (holding that lead paint manufacturers could not be liable for public
n isance beca se he proper o ners, ra her han he man fac rers, ere in con rol of he alleged
n isance, as lead pain in b ildings is only a hazard if it is deteriorating, flaking, or otherwise
dis rbed ).
177. See TIMOTHY D. LYTTON, SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY 12 14 (Timothy D. Lytton ed., 2005)
(summarizing the history of the li iga ion and ario s co r s recep ion o p blic n isance claims).
178. Recently, hundreds of cities, counties, states, and tribes have filed public nuisance suits against
opioid manufacturers. See Jackie Fortier, Thi Ca e Wi Se a P ecede : 1 Maj O i id T ia
Opens in Oklahoma, NAT L PUB. RADIO (May 27, 2019, 4:21 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019
/05/27/724093091/this-case-will-set-a-precedent-first-major-opioid-trial-to-begin-in-oklahoma
[https://perma.cc/CK7Z-NCUM] (reporting on the start of the trial in the case brought by Oklahoma
against Johnson & Johnson alleging that the company is liable under public nuisance doctrine for its
marketing practices that contributed to the sta e s opioid addic ion crisis, and no ing ha he case ill
set precedent for the hundreds of other pending cases). In late summer of 2019, an Oklahoma trial
judge found that Johnson & Johnson was liable to the state for creating a public nuisance by fueling
an opioid epidemic with its marketing practices, and ordered the company to pay the state $572
million for treatment programs and other expenses incurred as a result of the crisis. See State v. Purdue
Pharma L.P., No. CJ-2017-816, slip op. at 22 25, 29 41 (Okla. Dist. Ct. Aug. 26, 2019); see also
Karen Savage, After Opioids, Will Climate Change Be the Next Successful Liability Battle?, CLIMATE
DOCKET (Sept. 12, 2019), https://www.climatedocket.com/2019/09/12/opioids-liability-climatechange/ [https://perma.cc/AE6U-K36J] ( In bo h se s of cases, he plain iffs poin o a long his or of
corporate knowledge about the harms their products cause, and concerted efforts to hide that
kno ledge and profi from b siness as s al. (quoting Michael Burger, Exec. Dir., Sabin Ctr. for
Climate Change L., Columbia Univ.)).
179. Minneso a brings a n mber of claims nder Minneso a s cons mer pro ec ion s a es. See
Minnesota Complaint, supra note 141, at 73 82. The District of Columbia filed a climate case the
day after Minnesota did, and is the first to rely solely on consumer protection statutes. See Complaint
at 67 77, District of Columbia v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 2020-CA-002892-B (D.C. Sup. Ct. June
25, 2020). The nature of the wrongful conduct alleged and of the harms for which the government is
seeking redress, however, are similar to all the second-wave climate tort cases.
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second-wave cases180 assert products liability claims. All states have
developed this now quite rich body of tort law specifically for the purpose
of addressing harms caused by wrongful manufacture and marketing of
products.181 These sorts of claims are well-suited to cases, such as the
second- a e clima e cases, ha allege a prod c man fac rer s
s s ema ic se of a disinforma ion pl s pa h-dependence s ra eg 182 to
continue profiting from the sale of their products notwithstanding clear
evidence of their catastrophic nature.
Given the potential power of the second-wave strategy of relying solely
on state tort law, and, for the most part, filing in state court, it is not
surprising that the fossil fuel industry defendants have responded with
arg men s ha seek bo h o federali e he plain iffs s a e claims and o
get them before federal courts.
C.

The Defe da
Re
e
of State Tort Law Claims

he Sec d Wa e: Fede a i a i

All the defendants have responded to these new second-wave statefoc sed s ra egies b seeking o federali e he s a e la claims, and o
then reassert the largely successful arguments that resulted in dismissals
of the first-wave cases. They primarily rely on the one that succeeded
before the U.S. Supreme Court i.e., displacement. Because only federal
common law, and not state common law, can be displaced by the Clean
Air Act or any other federal statute, however, this defense requires a twostep process. The first step of this new argument is that the state tort claims
are preemp ed b federal common la .183 Specifically, the defendants
claim ha he plain iffs s a e or claims are based on global-warming
rela ed inj ries ha implica e[] niq el federal in eres s and h s
must be addressed, if at all, under federal common law.184 In all the
180. See Fishermen s Complain , supra note 138, at 80 85; Rhode Island Complaint, supra note
136, at 120 33; San Mateo Complaint, supra note 149, at 81 87; Honolulu Complaint, supra note
139, at 106 08.
181. Indeed, state products liability law became so well-developed in the second half of the
twentieth century that the reporters for the Restatement (Third) of Torts devoted an entire volume to
it. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY (AM. LAW INST. 1998). The
Restatement (Second) of Torts, which was published around three decades before, contained only one
section addressing it. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
182. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
183. The notices of remo al do no se he erm preemp ion, b his is he proper a o
characterize the trumping of state law by federal common law. See 14C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT &
ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION AND RELATED MATTERS
§ 4515 (rev. 4th ed. April 2020 update).
184. See Notice of Removal ¶ 5, California v. BP P.L.C., No. 3:17-cv-6011-WHA (N.D. Cal. Oct.
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second-wave cases filed in state court, the defendants have filed a notice
of removal on this ground.185 With only federal law at stake, the
defendants argue, they are entitled to remove the cases from the state
courts in which they were filed. Next, the defendants argue that the federal
courts should dismiss the cases because the only proper claim the
federal common law claim is displaced by the Clean Air Act under AEP,
or, in the alternative, presents a nonjusticiable political question.186
The argument that state tort climate claims are preempted by federal
common law has succeeded in two courts so far. In one of the cases
brought in California state court by Oakland and San Francisco the
five fossil-fuel industry defendants removed the case, and Northern
District of California J dge William Als p denied he ci ies mo ion o
remand.187 A little less than a month later, on the other side of the country,
Southern District of New York Judge John Keenan relied on Judge
Als p s opinion in agreeing i h he defendan s ha Ne York Ci s
state claims were preempted by federal common law.188 In so holding,
neither judge applied a particular standard, but rather relied on Supreme
Court cases recognizing that it was appropriate for federal courts to
develop federal common law to deal with interstate pollution.189
The plain iffs s a e claims in hese o cases ere preemp ed b a
federal common law claim whose existence was apparently fleeting,

20, 2017). This notice of removal in the case brought by Oakland and San Francisco was the first one
filed by the second-wave defendants, and the notices filed in all the other suits make the same
arguments and track the language quoted here.
185. The city and county of Honolulu filed its complaint shortly before this Article went to press,
and the defendants have not yet filed a notice of removal in that case.
186. See, e.g., Defendan s Mo ion o Dismiss Firs Amended Complaints; Memorandum of Points
and Authorities at 8, City of Oakland v. BP P.L.C., No. 3:17-cv-6011-WHA (N.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2018)
( Federal common la does no pro ide relief here beca se, in addi ion o o her defec s, Plain iffs
global warming-based tort claims whether framed as targeting greenhouse gas emissions, oil and
gas extraction and production, or fossil-fuel product promotion have been displaced by federal
s a e. ). As e plained infra note 187 and accompanying text, the defendants in California v. BP
P.L.C. also successfully argued that application of federal common law would be improper based on
what appears to be a combina ion of he e ra erri oriali
principle de eloped b he S preme
Court in the context of the Alien Tort Statute and the political question doctrine. No. C 17-06011
WHA, 2018 WL 1064293 (N.D. Cal. 2018). The defendants assert a number of other arguments, but
these are the ones on which they primarily rely and which, as discussed infra in the rest of this section,
have been the only ones to which the courts have given serious consideration.
187. See Order Denying Motions to Remand at 8, California v. BP P.L.C., No. C 17-06011 WHA,
2018 WL 1064293, at *15 (N.D. Cal. 2018).
188. See City of N.Y. v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 466, 471, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
189. See id. at 471 (first ci ing In l Paper Co. . O elle e, 479 U.S. 481 (1987); and then citing
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee (Milwaukee I), 406 U.S. 91 (1972)); California v. BP P.L.C., 2018 WL
1064293 at *2 3 (citing and quoting Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. 91).
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ho e er. Bo h j dges agreed i h he second s ep of he defendan s
argument as well, and thus dismissed the federal common law claims that
he had j s concl ded preemp ed he ci ies s a e claims. Tha is,
paradoxically, the federal common law claims existed only long enough
to preempt the state claims, at which point they were immediately
displaced by the Clean Air Act. More specifically, both courts held that,
to the extent that the claims were based on climate harms caused by
domes ic emissions from he defendan s fossil f el prod c s, he
ere
displaced by the Clean Air Act.190 And to the extent that the harms were
caused by emissions from products outside the United States, the courts
held that the claims were barred by what appears to be essentially a
foreign polic foc sed applica ion of he poli ical q es ion doc rine.191
Importantly, unlike the Supreme Court in AEP, Judges Alsup and Keenan
bo h concl ded ha , beca se he plain iffs s a e claims had alread been
preempted, they did not reemerge in the wake of the dismissals of the
federal common law claims.192
The other four federal district judges who have thus far addressed the
second- a e defendan s
federali a ion arg men Judges Vince
190. See New York, 325 F. S pp. 3d a 474 ( [T]he Ci alleges ha i s climate-change related
injuries are the direct result of the emission of greenho se gases from he comb s ion of Defendan s
fossil fuels, and not the production and sale of those fossil fuels. Thus, the City ultimately seeks to
hold Defendants liable for the same conduct at issue in AEP and Kivalina: greenhouse gas
emissions. . . . Thus, . . . he Ci s claims are displaced. ) (emphasis in original); City of Oakland v.
BP P.L.C., 325 F. S pp. 3d 1017, 1024 (N.D. Cal. 2018) ( The harm alleged b o r plain iffs remains
a harm caused by fossil fuel emissions, not the mere extraction or even sale of fossil fuels. . . . If an
oil producer cannot be sued under the federal common law for their own emissions, a fortiori they
canno be s ed for someone else s. ) (emphasis in original).
191. See New York, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 475 76; Oakland, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 1024 28. In opposing
he defendan s mo ions o dismiss in hese cases, he plain iffs arg ed ha he federal common law
claims were not displaced both because (1) he
ere based on defendan s prod c ion and sale of
fossil fuels, and not, like the first-wave cases, on their emissions of greenhouse gases, and (2) their
damages were caused by the combustion of fossil fuel products all over the world, and the Clean Air
Act regulates only domestic activities. See supra note 190 and accompanying text. Both courts
rejected the first distinction, and, although they acknowledged that the Clean Air Act did not displace
the claims to the extent that they were seeking redress for harms caused by emissions outside the
United States, both held that the global nature of the claims raised significant foreign policy issues
appropriately addressed only by the political branches. New York, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 475 76 ( Here,
the City seeks to hold Defendants liable for the emissions that result from their worldwide production,
marketing, and sale of fossil fuels. . . . Such claims implicate countless foreign governments and their
laws and policies. . . . [T]he immense and complicated problem of global warming requires a
comprehensive solution that weighs the global benefits of fossil fuel use with the gravity of the
impending harms. To litigate such an action . . . in federal court would severely infringe upon the
foreign-policy decisions that are squarely within the purview of the political branches of the U.S.
Government. Accordingly, the Court will exercise appropriate caution and decline to recognize such
a ca se of ac ion. ).
192. See New York, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 474; Oakland, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 1028 29.
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Chhabria, also of the Northern District of California, Ellen Hollander of
the District of Maryland, William Smith of the District of Rhode Island,
and William Martinez of the District of Colorado have concluded that it
does not provide a basis for federal removal jurisdiction, and accordingly
remanded to the state courts.193 In doing so, these courts made an
impor an dis inc ion ha he defendan s arg ment evades and that Judge
Als p apparen l o erlooked, namel , ha be een comple e and
ordinar preemption.194
Although the defendants in all of the second-wave cases sought
removal on the basis of federal preemption of state law, in most cases that
doctrine does not provide a basis for federal jurisdiction. In almost all
cases, federal jurisdiction exists, and thus removal is proper, only if a
federal iss e appears on he face of a ell-pleaded complain . 195 This
r le, kno n as he
ell-pleaded complain r le, is long-standing.196
Thus, in the vast majority of cases, federal preemption of state law is an
affirmative defense that the state court in which the complaint is filed is
perfectly capable of addressing.197 The cases in which the Supreme Court
has departed from this rule and found federal court jurisdiction on
preemption grounds are few and far between.198 Indeed, there are only
193. See Cnty. of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp., 294 F. Supp. 3d 934, 939 (N.D. Cal. 2018); Mayor
of Balt. v. BP, 338 F. Supp. 3d 538, 574 (D. Md. 2019); Rhode Island v. Chevron Corp., 393 F. Supp.
3d 142, 152 (D.R.I. 2019); Boulder Cnty. v. Suncor Energy, Inc., 405 F. Supp. 3d 937, 981 (D. Colo.
2019).
194. See San Mateo, 294 F. Supp. 3d at 938; Mayor of Balt., 338 F. Supp. 3d at 554 58; Rhode
Island, 393 F. Supp. 3d at 149 50; Boulder Cnty., 405 F. Supp. 3d at 972.
195. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393 (1987) ( The presence or absence of federalq es ion j risdic ion is go erned b he ell-pleaded complain r le, hich pro ides ha federal
j risdic ion e is s onl
hen a federal q es ion is presen ed on he face of he plain iff s properl
pleaded complain . ).
196. See Lo is ille & Nash ille R.R. Co. . Mo le , 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908) ( I is he se led
interpretation of these words, as used in this statute, conferring jurisdiction, that a suit arises under
the Constitution and la s of he Uni ed S a es onl hen he plain iff s s a emen of his o n ca se of
ac ion sho s ha i is based pon hose la s or ha Cons i ion. ).
197. See Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr., 463 U.S. 1, 14 (1983)
( [S]ince 1887 i has been se led la ha a case ma no be remo ed o federal co r on he basis of
a federal defense, including the defense of preemption, even if the defense is anticipated in the
plain iff s complain , and e en if bo h par ies admi ha he defense is he onl q es ion r l a iss e
in he case. (emphasis added)).
198. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 183, § 4515 ( Al ho gh defendan s a emp s o remo e a case
to federal court based on federal preemption generally have been unsuccessful because it is a matter
of affirmative defense, some courts have concluded that a federal statute can preempt what appears
to be a state cause of action so completely that removal is available even when the plaintiff never
invoked federal common law or any other basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction in the original
complaint. By virtue of the force of the federal statute, the state claim is treated as if it has been
replaced b and in reali s a ed a federal la claim. ).
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three categories of cases in which courts have concluded that so-called
comple e preemp ion e is s, hich does pro ide a basis for federal
question jurisdiction. All three involve areas of law in which federal
courts have developed common law as necessary to adjudicate claims
requiring application of comprehensive congressional statutes.199 Thus, all
four district courts held that any preemption of state law by federal
common la alone is ordinar ra her han comple e, and accordingl
can never provide a basis for removal.200 They accordingly remanded the
cases to state court, where the defendants can and undoubtedly will
asser ordinar preemp ion as an affirma i e defense.201
The plaintiffs in Oakland and the defendants in San Mateo appealed to
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, and the plaintiffs in New York to the
Second Circuit. The defendants in the Colorado, Rhode Island, and
Baltimore cases all appealed the remand orders, bringing the issue before
the First, Fourth, and Tenth Circuits as well. As of this writing, the
Fourth,202 Ninth,203 and Tenth204 Circuits have decided the cases. The
Fourth and Tenth Circuit panels, as well as the Ninth Circuit panel in its
decision in the San Mateo case, did not address the question of
preemption complete or ordinary. Rather, they all held that the only
basis on which defendan s ma appeal a dis ric co r s remand order
under 28 U.S.C § 1447 is federal officer remo al j risdic ion, and ha
the fossil fuel companies had failed to establish that basis.205 Although the
199. See id. § 3722.2 (e plaining ha [b]eca se of he ob io s federalism implica ions of he
complete-preemp ion doc rine, he co r s ha e limi ed i s applica ion o ac ions nder he Labor
Relations Management Act and the Employee Retirement and Income Security Act, and to claims
against banks chartered under the National Bank Act).
200. See Cnty. of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp., 294 F. Supp. 3d 934, 938 (N.D. Cal. 2018); Mayor
of Balt. v. BP, 338 F. Supp. 3d 538, 554 58 (D. Md. 2019); Boulder Cnty. v. Suncor Energy, Inc.,
405 F. Supp. 3d 937, 981 (D. Colo. 2019); Rhode Island v. Chevron Corp., 393 F. Supp. 3d 142, 149
50 (D.R.I. 2019) ( Wi ho a federal s a e ielding or authorizing the federal courts to wield
e raordinar pre-emp i e po er, here can be no comple e preemp ion. (q o ing Me ro. Life Ins.
Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65 (1987)); Mayor of Balt., 338 F. Supp. 3d at 557 (citing Gil Seinfeld,
Climate Change Litigation in the Federal Courts: Jurisdictional Lessons from California v. BP, 117
MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 25, 32 35 (2018)) (rel ing on Seinfeld s renchan cri iq e of J dge Als p s
opinion).
201. See supra text accompanying notes 172 174.
202. Mayor of Balt. v. BP P.L.C., 952 F.3d 452 (4th Cir. 2020).
203. City of Oakland v. BP P.L.C., 960 F.3d 570 (9th Cir. 2020); Cnty. of San Mateo v. Chevron
Corp., 960 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 2020).
204. Boulder Cnty. v. Suncor Energy, No. 19-1330, 2020 WL 3777996 (10th Cir. July 7, 2020).
205. See id. at *17, *23; San Mateo, 960 F.3d at 598, 603; Mayor of Balt., 952 F.3d a 457 ( [T]his
decision is only about whether one path to federal court lies open. Because 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d)
confines our appellate jurisdiction, the narrow question before us is whether removal of this lawsuit
is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1442, commonly referred to as the federal officer removal statute.

Sokol_ Paginated UPDATED_jci (Do Not Delete)

1422

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

10/5/2020 3:53 PM

[Vol. 95:1383

defendan s ha e asser ed federal officer as a basis of federal court
jurisdiction in all of the second-wave cases, none of the district court
judges including Judge Alsup have agreed with that argument. The
defendan s in Bal imore s case immedia el filed a pe i ion for ri of
certiorari to the Supreme Court, arg ing ha he Fo r h Circ i s
precedent interpreting § 1447 as permitting review of only federal officer
removal jurisdiction, and not of any other jurisdictional bases asserted by
a defendant, falls on the wrong side of a circuit split on the issue.206
The same Nin h Circ i panel heard he plain iffs appeal of J dge
Als p s decision finding federal j risdic ion, and held ha he erred in
finding federal-question jurisdiction because the defendants had failed to
establish either of the two exceptions to he
ell-pleaded complain
rule ha he plain iff s s a e or claim of n isance raised a s bs an ial
federal q es ion 207 or was completely preempted by a federal law.208
Judge Alsup did not decide on any of the other bases for removal that the
defendants had asserted; however, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to
the district court to decide whether any of the other bases were proper.209
Regardless ho he S preme Co r r les on he ind s r s pe i ion in
Bal imore s case, he iss e of preemp ion of he state climate claims by
federal common law is likely to eventually come before the Court. The
q es ion of comple e preemp ion as irrele an o J dge Keenan s
anal sis in Ne York Ci s case since he ci originall filed i s s a e
claims as a diversity action in federal court. Thus, the Second Circuit will
have to address the question of whether Judge Keenan correctly concluded
that the state climate claims are preempted by federal common law under
ordinar preemp ion anal sis.210 The defendants will almost certainly
assert the defense in the state courts in California, Rhode Island,
Bal imore, Colorado, Ha ai i, Minneso a, and, l ima el , in all he o her
second-wave cases that may still be filed. That is, all the courts will
probably face the question of whether federal common law preempts the
state climate claims their answers, and, ultimately that of the Supreme
Court may decide the future of climate tort litigation.
And . . . . because we conclude that § 1442 does not provide a proper basis for removal, we affirm the
dis ric co r s remand order. ).
206. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2 3, BP v. Mayor of Balt., No. 19-1189 (Mar. 31, 2020).
207. Oakland, 960 F.3d at 580 81.
208. Id. at 581 82.
209. Id. at 585.
210. As Judge Hollander pointed out in her thoughtful and exhaustive opinion, the New York
dis ric co r s anal sis as inapposi e, since ha he co r did no consider he her [i s finding ha
federal common law preemp ed Ne York Ci s s a e claims] conferred federal q es ion j risdic ion
beca se he plain iffs originall filed heir complain in federal co r based on di ersi j risdic ion.
Mayor of Balt. v. BP, 338 F. Supp. 3d 538, 557 (D. Md. 2019).
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As he ini ial j dicial responses o he defendan s preemp ion
argument indicate, the proper analysis of the issue whether state tort law
is preempted by the federal common law of nuisance is far from clear.
This is perhaps not surprising given that there are only a handful of key
Supreme Court federal common law nuisance cases. In most of them, the
Court is just as if not more concerned with the question whether it
should exercise its original jurisdiction. In light of the second-wave
defendan s federali a ion defense s ra eg , ho e er, he q es ion of
preemption of state tort law by federal common law sorely
needs clarification.
III. THE FEDERAL COMMON LAW CLAIM OF PUBLIC
NUISANCE AND STATE TORT LAW
There is a significant amount of case law on the preemption of state
law by federal statutory law, and the analytical framework for analyzing
the issue is well-established.211 In contrast, the Supreme Court has never
directly addressed the issue of how to properly determine whether federal
common law preempts state law.212 When the Court has stated that there
are issues of special federal interest that should be governed by federal
common law rather than state common law it has done so mainly with
the goal of justifying the rare exercise of federal judicial power to make
and apply federal common law, rather than leaving the matter to resolution
by state tort law. Indeed, such justification is called for given that the
Court held over eighty years ago that state tort law is appropriate in the
vast majority of cases.
In Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,213 the Supreme Court put federal
co r s o of he b siness of fashioning federal general common la ,
reasoning that such lawmaking is not within the federal judicial power:
Congress has no po er o declare s bs an i e r les of common la
applicable in a state . . . [a]nd no clause in the Constitution purports to
confer s ch a po er pon federal co r s. 214 In the wake of Erie, however,
the Court has recognized limited situations in which federal common law
211. See, e.g., Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. . S a e Energ Res. Conser a ion & De . Comm n, 461 U.S.
190, 203 04 (1983) (setting out the well-established three ways in which Congress can preempt state
law: express, field, and obstacle preemption); Marin R. Scordato, Federal Preemption of State Tort
Claims, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 2 (2001) ( As federal law making and federal regulation have
increased in size and importance, so too has the doctrine of federal preemp ion. ).
212. As noted supra, note 19, the focus of this Article is on federal common law outside of the
maritime area.
213. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
214. Id. at 78.
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should govern. When it has done so, however, it has taken care to justify
departure from Erie based on the federal judicial role in U.S.
constitutional structure in light of the specific nature of the case at hand.215
In recognizing its authority to establish a federal common law doctrine
of nuisance, the Supreme Court has primarily relied on the interstate
nature of the disputes in which it has applied the doctrine, rather than on
the idea that environmental harms presented issues that were necessarily
federal in na re.216 In one of its earliest federal nuisance cases, which
involved a claim brought by Missouri against Illinois seeking to abate
sewage discharges from Chicago into a river that fed into the Mississippi
River, the Court stated:
It may be imagined that a nuisance might be created by a state
upon a navigable river like the Danube, which would amount to a
casus belli for a state lower down, unless removed. If such a
nuisance were created by a state upon the Mississippi, the
controversy would be resolved by the more peaceful means of a
suit in this court.217
Similarly but somewhat less dramatically, around seven decades later
in another case in which a state brought suit to abate sewage discharges
from another state, he Co r no ed: When e deal i h air and a er in
their ambient or interstate aspects, there is federal common law . . . . 218
That some federal common law has survived Erie, however, does not
mean that every claim by a jurisdiction alleging that it suffered harm
caused by activities that took place outside of it must be a federal common
law claim. Indeed, in some of the same cases in which the Court has
recognized the propriety of federal common law, it has also recognized
the possibility that state common law may be applicable. In its pre-Erie
215. See, e.g., WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 183, § 4514 ( To some extent, each exercise of
federal common lawmaking is sui generis in that it is the product of the unique interplay of specific
statutory or constitutional language, case-sensitive federal policy concerns, and other case-specific
fac ors. (emphasis added)).
216. See generally id. § 4517 (in explaining the development of federal common law nuisance
doc rine, no ing ha he Co r had concl ded ha cases in ol ing disp es o er in ers a e
bo ndaries, s reams, air, or a er poll ion presen federal q es ions appropriately resolved by
federal common la go ern[ing] in ers a e proprie ar and ecological con ro ersies ).
217. Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 520 21 (1906); see also Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206
U.S. 230, 237 (1907) ( When he s a es b heir nion made he forcible aba emen of o side
nuisances, they did not thereby agree to submit to whatever might be done. They did not renounce the
possibility of making reasonable demands on the ground of their still remaining quasi-sovereign
in eres s; and he al erna i e o force is a s i in his co r . ). Cas s belli is a La in phrase meaning
an e en or ac ion hat justifies . . . a ar. Casus belli, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/casus%20belli [https://perma.cc/NB9L-AYQU].
218. Illinois v. Milwaukee (Milwaukee I), 406 U.S. 91, 103 (1972).
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nuisance cases, the Court adjudicated the claims, which were brought by
a state against another state or the citizens thereof, in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction.219 As a result, the question of the role of state law in
such cases did not arise until after both Erie and the enactment of federal
environmental legislation. Section A lays out how the Court has dealt with
that issue so far and the significant questions that remain about the
appropriate way to deal with it. Section B provides a recommendation for
a clear rule based on the relevant case law so far and principles
of federalism.
A.

What Little We Know about Preemption of State Nuisance Law by
Federal Nuisance Law

In the 1972 case Illinois v. Milwaukee (Milwaukee I),220 Illinois
in oked he S preme Co r s original j risdic ion o enjoin ci ies and
municipal agencies in Wisconsin from discharging untreated and
improperly treated sewage into Lake Michigan.221 The Court declined to
exercise its original jurisdiction, in part because federal common law is
federal law for purposes of federal subject matter jurisdiction, so the
federal dis ric co r pro ided a en e for Illinois s claim. 222 That was not
the end of the matter for the Court, however there is a Milwaukee II,
Milwaukee v. Illinois.223 Shortly after Illinois refiled in district court,
Congress enacted the Clean Water Act (CWA).224 The district court
concl ded ha he CWA did no displace he s a e s federal common la
claim, the Seventh Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari and held that the lower courts were wrong. 225 Congress, the
Court concluded, had displaced federal common law nuisance claims
in ol ing a er poll ion b speaking direc l
o he iss e in he
CWA.226 In so holding, the Court emphasized the highly limited nature of
federal common law in the U.S. constitutional structure. The Court noted
ha i is s a e, and no federal, co r s ha possess a general po er o

219. See Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. at 236, 240; Missouri, 200 U.S. at 517.
220. 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
221. Id. at 93.
222. See id. a 98, 100, 108 ( While his original s i normall migh be he appropria e ehicle for
resolving this controversy, we exercise our discretion to remit the parties to an appropriate district
court . . . . ).
223. 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
224. Id. at 310.
225. Id. at 310 12.
226. Id. at 315, 332.

Sokol_ Paginated UPDATED_jci (Do Not Delete)

1426

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

10/5/2020 3:53 PM

[Vol. 95:1383

de elop and appl heir o n r les of decision. 227 Accordingl , [ ]he
enactment of a federal rule in an area of national concern, and the decision
whether to displace state law in doing so, is generally made not by the
federal judiciary, purposefully insulated from democratic pressures, but
by the people thro gh heir elec ed represen a i es in Congress. 228 As a
res l , hile s a e common la is ro ine, 229 federal common la is a
necessar e pedien
and
n s al e ercise of la making b
federal co r s. 230
Beca se s a es la making po er is so m ch grea er han that of the
federal co r s, he Co r rejec ed Illinois s arg men ha he q es ion
whether Congress had displaced federal common law was governed by
the same analysis as the question whether Congress had preempted state
law.231 The Court will assume that state law is not preempted unless that
is he clear and manifes p rpose of Congress. 232 In contrast, it is not
necessar ha Congress affirma i el proscribe[] he se of federal
common la for i o be displaced, b ra her onl ha Congress sp[eak]
direc l o a q es ion pre io sl go erned b federal common la .233
Given the difference in the stringency of these standards, it necessarily
follows that legislation may displace federal common law but leave state
law including state common law intact. The Supreme Court reached
this conclusion in its next federal common law nuisance case, also
involving interstate water pollution: International Paper Co. v.
Ouellette.234
In International Paper, landowners in Vermont on the shore of Lake
Champlain sued a pulp and paper mill (IPC) located on the New York side
of the lake, alleging that IPC was liable for nuisance under Vermont
common law for the discharge of pollutants into the lake.235 IPC
responded that the CWA preempted the state nuisance claim; the district
court and Second Circuit disagreed.236 The Supreme Court held that the

227. Id. at 312.
228. Id. at 312 13 (emphasis added).
229. Id. at 329.
230. Id. at 314.
231. See id. a 316 ( Con rar o he s gges ion of responden s, he appropria e anal sis in
determining if federal statutory law governs a question previously the subject of federal common law
is not the same at that employed in deciding if federal law pre-empts s a e la . ).
232. Id. (quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977)).
233. Id. at 315.
234. 479 U.S. 481 (1987).
235. Id. at 483 84. The landowners filed their claim in Vermont state court, and IPC removed it.
236. See id. at 484 87.
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CWA preempted a Vermont nuisance claim, but not a New York nuisance
claim.237 Beca se he CWA specifically allows source States to impose
stricter standards, the imposition of source-state law does not disrupt the
reg la or par nership es ablished b he [s a e]. 238 Importantly, that
necessarily means that state common law is not preempted by the CWA
even though, as the Court held in Milwaukee II, that statute displaces all
federal common law claims involving interstate water pollution. In
making his concl sion, he Co r relied on he CWA s sa ings cla se,239
which, as discussed above, is substantively similar to that in the Clean
Air Act.240
The logic of he Co r s decision in International Paper makes sense
given that, as the Milwaukee II Court emphasized, federal common law is
much more readily displaced by federal legislation than state law is
preempted thereby. This is not the part of the decision that the defendants
rely on to support their argument for preemption of the state climate
claims by federal common law, however. They rely on the International
Paper Co r s ra her p ling charac eri a ion of he impor of
Milwaukee I. In holding that the federal common law of nuisance applied,
the Milwaukee I Court was primarily focused on justifying its decision to
den Illinois s req es ha he Co r e ercise i s original j risdic ion, and
h s on he na re of federal common la as federal la for p rposes
of federal question jurisdiction.241 The Court did not directly address the
issue of the possible availability of state court claims. Rather, in a footnote
accompan ing i s concl sion ha
federal la
go erns, 242 the
Court stated:
237. See id. at 498 99 (in j s if ing i s concl sion ha An ac ion bro gh agains IPC nder Ne
York nuisance law would not frustrate the goals of the CWA as would a suit governed by Vermont
la , he Co r e plained he reg la or frame ork es ablished he CWA based on he Na ional
Permi Discharge Elimina ion S s em: Firs , applica ion of he so rce S a e s la does no dis rb
the balance among federal, source-state, and affected-state interests. Because the Act specifically
allows source States to impose stricter standards, the imposition of source-state law does not disrupt
the regulatory partnership established by the permit system. Second, the restriction of suits to those
brought under source-state nuisance law prevents a source from being subject to an indeterminate
number of potential regulations. Although New York nuisance law may impose separate standards
and thus create some tension with the permit system, a source only is required to look to a single
additional authority, whose rules should be relatively predictable. Moreover, States can be expected
o ake in o acco n heir o n n isance la s in se ing permi req iremen s ).
238. Id. at 499.
239. Id. a 497 ( The sa ing cla se specificall preser es o her s a e ac ions, and herefore no hing
in the Act bars aggrieved individuals from bringing a nuisance claim pursuant to the law of the source
S a e. ) (emphasis in orginal).
240. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e); supra text accompanying notes 173 174.
241. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
242. Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. 91, 107 (1972).
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Federal common law and not the varying common law of the
individual States is, we think, entitled and necessary to be
recognized as a basis for dealing in uniform standard with the
environmental rights of a State against improper impairment by
sources outside its domain . . . . And the logic and practicality of
regarding such claims as being entitled to be asserted within the
federal-question jurisdiction . . . would seem to be self-evident.243
Citing this footnote, the International Paper Court explained that the
implici corollar of he Milwaukee I Co r s de ermina ion ha federal
la go erned as ha s a e common la
as preemp ed. 244 The Court
does not explain, however, how state law that was preempted by federal
law before the enactment of the CWA could be resurrected after its
enactment displaced federal common law. And in neither International
Paper, nor any of its other federal common law nuisance cases, has the
Court articulated a clear standard for determining whether federal
common law preempts state common law. Rather, we are left to flesh out
he implici corollar of a 1972 opinion i h ag e references o he
need for a federal
niform s andard and he general idea of
environmental nuisances that cross state lines.
Now, almost five decades later, this absence of a meaningful standard
has become a problem. The fossil fuel industry defendants have made
ha has here ofore been an implici corollar , co pled i h ag e
references o he na ional and federal na re of the problem of climate
disr p ion, par of heir primar defense in he second-wave cases. And
two district courts have agreed with them.
In the following section, this Article proposes a rule that is the most
logical in ligh of he S preme Co r s relevant federal common law
nuisance cases and the most consistent with general principles
of federalism.
B.

Bringing Clarity to Preemption of State Nuisance Law by Federal
Common Law

AEP is the most recent case in which the Supreme Court has addressed
the question whether a federal common law nuisance claim is displaced
and the relationship between federal common law and state common law.
As noted above, the AEP Court confirmed that federal common law is
displaced if Congress has spoken direc l o he iss e.245 The Court also
243. Id. at 107 n.9.
244. In l Paper Co. . O elle e, 479 U.S. 481, 488 (1987).
245. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut (AEP), 564 U.S. 410, 424 (2011) ( The es for he her
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confirmed that a decision that federal common law is displaced does not
mean that state common law is preempted, as that is a different and
much more exacting inquiry.246 Thus, after holding that the federal
nuisance claim in that case was displaced by the CAA, the AEP Court
s a ed ha , as [n]one of he par ies ha e briefed preemp ion or o her ise
addressed the availability of a claim under state nuisance
law . . . [w]e . . . lea e he ma er open for considera ion on remand. 247
The Court also noted that the Second Circuit had not addressed the
q es ion he her he CAA preemp ed he plain iffs s a e claims beca se
i held ha federal common la go erned. 248 In making this point, the
Court cited International Paper and included the following quote in the
accompan ing paren he ical: if a case sho ld be resol ed b reference o
federal common law[,] . . . s a e common la [is] preemp ed. 249 The
implication is that if a federal claim is displaced, state claims may
still exist.
Thus, the Milwaukee I Milwaukee II International Paper line of
reasoning means that Judges Alsup and Keenan were wrong in concluding
ha he plain iffs s a e claims did no reemerge af er hose j dges
concluded that the federal common law claim was displaced. On the one
hand, there is arguably some logic to the idea that state claims do not
reemerge after being preempted by federal common law. On the other
hand, it seems odd that federal common law, which disappears merely if
Congress direc l speaks o an iss e, can preempt state claims that are
pres med no o be preemp ed b legisla ion nless here is e idence of
a clear and manifes [congressional] p rpose o do so.250
Ra her han an implici corollar based on ag e ideas abo he need
for national uniformity, interstate environmental nuisances, and so on, the
question of preemption of state common law by federal common law
should, if anything, be governed by a more exacting standard than
preemption of state law by federal statutes. Crafting such a standard is
congressional legislation excludes the declaration of federal common law is simply whether the
s a e speak[s] direc l o [ he] q es ion a iss e. (q o ing Mobil Oil Corp. . Higginbo ham, 436
U.S. 618, 625 (1978))).
246. See id. a 423, 429 ( Legislative displacement of federal common law does not require the
same sor of e idence of a clear and manifes [congressional] p rpose demanded for preemp ion of
state law. (al era ion in original) (q o ing Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981))); id. ( In light of
our holding that the Clean Air Act displaces federal common law, the availability vel non of a state
lawsuit depends, inter alia, on the preemptive effect of the federal Act. ).
247. Id. at 429.
248. Id. at 429.
249. Id. at 429 (quoting I
Pa e , 479 U.S. at 488).
250. Id. at 423 (quoting Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 317).
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diffic l if no impossible, ho e er, beca se he o chs one of he
congressional preemption standard is congressional intent.251 There is no
such intent to divine when it comes to federal common law, which is an
n s al e ercise of la making po er b federal courts that they resort
o onl as a necessar e pedien in limi ed cases.252 Indeed, the idea that
law of that sort can preempt state tort law is in tension with the
constitutional rationale underlying the congressional preemption
standard namely, protecting the U.S. federal system of government. As
he Co r has repea edl s a ed: [W]e s ar i h he ass mp ion ha he
historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the
Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress
so o r anal sis [ ill] incl de[] d e regard for he pres pposi ions of o r
embracing federal system, including the principle of diffusion of power
not as a matter of doctrinaire localism but as a promoter of
democrac . 253 Developing an equally stringent standard much less a
more exacting one is not possible with federal common law, which
federal courts do not make with the sort of intent that Congress does when
it legislates and for which it is accountable. Particularly in a post-Erie
world, then, the only way out of this doctrinal dilemma is to recognize
preemption of state tort claims only by federal statutes, and not by the thin
body of federal common law that federal judges have essentially been out
of the business of making and applying for over eight decades. Indeed,
to allow preemption of state law by federal common would turn Erie on
its head.
Importantly, the idea that federal common law might preempt state tort
la and he concomi an ideas of he federal in eres s implica ed b
in ers a e en ironmen al n isances did no emerge in he Co r s federal
common law nuisance cases until after Erie, when the Court had to justify
its decision to apply federal common law rather than the applicable state
or la . In he Co r s pre-Erie nuisance cases, all of which were based
on its diversity jurisdiction, there was no need for such justifications; the
Court proceeded directly to the merits of the nuisance claims.254 In
Milwaukee I the post-Erie case ha is he so rce of he implici
corollar ha s a e or la ma be preemp ed b federal common la
251. Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996).
252. Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 314.
253. Id. at 316 (first quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); and then
quoting San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 243 (1959)).
254. See Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 236 39 (1907) (enjoining a copper smelting
compan in Tennessee from discharging no io s gas o er Georgia s erri or ); Misso ri . Illinois,
200 U.S. 496, 517, 526 (1906) (declining to issue an injunction after concluding that Missouri was
unable to prove that the typhoid bacillus polluting the Mississippi River near St. Louis originated
from Chicago sewage).
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the Court primarily emphasized the need to ensure that states had the
ability to protect the air and water on which their residents depended, even
if the state was unable to bring a nuisance suit under its own tort law and
in its own courts because of the location of the polluter:
When the States by their union made the forcible abatement of
outside nuisances impossible to each, they did not thereby agree
to submit to whatever might be done. They did not renounce the
possibility of making reasonable demands on the ground of their
still remaining quasi-sovereign interests; and the alternative to
force is a suit in this court.255
It may be that there are similar situations in which courts should
recognize federal common law nuisance claims. But where, as in the
second-wave climate cases, plaintiffs properly plead and bring state
claims in state court, they should never be deemed preempted by federal
common law alone. Indeed, the second-wave cases demonstrate that
allowing preemption by federal common law alone would be inconsistent
with Erie rationale. After all, the Court justified its pronouncement in that
case ha i as a fallac
o appl general federal common la in
diversity cases rather than the applicable state law for two reasons: first,
because doing so permitted noncitizens believing a federal rule of decision
would be more favorable to them to simply remove based on diversity
jurisdiction,256 and second, because states and Congress, and not federal
courts, have lawmaking authority under the Constitution.257 The fossil fuel
ind s r defendan s la es strategy of removing cases to federal court
based on federal q es ion j risdic ion (and, in Ne York Ci s case,
turning the state claims alleged in federal court into a federal claims)
presen s he same hrea o s a es abili o de elop and appl heir own
common la and o heir residen s abili o in oke i .258
255. Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. 91, 104 (1972) (quoting Tenn. Copper, 206 U.S. at 237).
256. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 76 (1938) ( [D]iscrimina ion res l ed from he
wide range of person held entitled to avail themselves of the federal rule by resort to the diversity of
ci i enship j risdic ion. ).
257. See id. at 78 79 ( E cep in ma ers go erned b he Federal Cons i ion or b ac s of
Congress, the law to be applied in any case is that of the state. . . . Congress has no power to declare
substantive rules of common law applicable in a state . . . be they commercial law or a part of the law
of or s. ).
258. In his opinion for the Court in Erie, Justice Brandeis strongly condemned the game playing to
secure a federal forum that took place in the pre-Erie case: Black & White Taxicab v. Brown & Yellow
Taxicab, 276 U.S. 518 (1928). See Erie, 304 U.S. at 73 74 ( Bro n & Yello , a Ken cky
corporation owned by Kentuckians, and the Louisville & Nashville Railroad, also a Kentucky
corporation, wished that the former should have the exclusive privilege of soliciting passenger and
baggage transportation at [a Kentucky] Railroad station; and that the Black & White, a competing
Kentucky corporation, should be prevented from interfering with that privilege. Knowing that such a
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Additionally, and perhaps even more importantly, this second-wave
defense strategy is ultimately simply a generalized argument that any sort
of claim relating to anthropogenic climate disruption does not belong in a
court, but rather is for the political branches to address, or to not address.
As the discussion above in Part II shows, that logic underlies every
successful first-wave strategy standing, political question, and
displacement. In accepting this generalized argument that is at best
loosely moored to the various doctrines on which it has purportedly been
based, most of the first-wave courts and two of the second-wave courts
have entirely failed to meaningfully engage with the nature of the
common law claims before them.
Even though these claims are about climate harms, they are asking
courts to do what courts have done in many different situations throughout
U.S. history: hold responsible parties accountable for wrongfully causing
legally cognizable harms. Yes, the current historical situation happens to
be a global, national, and local emergency that leaves no facet of life
untouched. And yes, courts are unable to respond to that emergency in the
way that policymakers can and must. But that does not mean the courts
have no role to play in the legal response to the climate crisis. To the
contrary, it means that facing their obligation to play a role by allowing
these claims to be heard is all the more essential. In the wake of the first
wave, this obligation now rests with state courts.
IV. THE URGENT NEED FOR CLIMATE STATE TORT CLAIMS
Pre en ing he federali a ion of he s a e or clima e claims b
disallowing preemption by federal common law is not only, as argued in
Part III, the better result as a legal matter. It is also the better result as a
policy matter. For at least two reasons, it is important that the plaintiffs be
allowed to litigate their climate tort claims now i.e., when climate tort
claims are so powerful, the climate emergency is only becoming more
devastating, and the fossil fuel industry is continuing to fuel the crisis by
con in ing i s disinforma ion pl s pa h-dependence s ra eg . The ne
two sections address each reason in turn.

contract would be void under the common law of Kentucky, it was arranged that the Brown & Yellow
reincorporate under the law of Tennessee, and that the contract with the railroad should be executed
there. The suit was then brought by the Tennessee corporation in the federal court for Western
Kentucky to enjoin competition by the Black & White; an injunction issued by the District Court was
sustained by the Court of Appeals; and this Court, citing many decisions in which the doctrine of
Swift & Tyson had been applied, affirmed he decree. ). The fossil f el ind s r defendan s a emp s
to remove the second-wave cases are very much the same sort of game playing.
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The Much Greater Suitability of State Tort Law to the SecondWave Claims than Federal Common Law

State tort law is a much richer body of law than the federal common
law of nuisance, which has not developed much since the beginning of the
twentieth century because of Erie. Consequently, federal common law is
ill-suited to the second-wave claims. The state nuisance claims are
different from the federal common law nuisance claims alleged by the
first-wave plaintiffs, and, indeed, from all of federal common law
nuisance claims based on pollution that the Supreme Court has addressed.
The second- a e clima e claims allege ha he defendan s marke ing of
fossil fuel products was tortious not, like the first-wave climate tort
cases or all other federal nuisance claims in Supreme Court cases, the
defendan s emissions or o her pes of poll an discharge. F r her, as
noted above, the plaintiffs in some of the second-wave cases allege not
only state nuisance claims, but also several products liability claims that
are unavailable in federal common law. 259
The second-wave climate tort suits are based on extensive, robust
scientific evidence of the causal link between combustion of fossil fuel
products and anthropogenic climate disruption.260 Additionally, the
plaintiffs have evidence supporting the specific, large contributions of
each par ic lar defendan s prod c s o he o al an hropogenic
greenhouse gas produced over time, and thus, to climate disruption.261
Finall , he ha e e ensi e doc men a ion of he defendan s kno ledge
of their contribution to the climate crisis and its devastating consequences
and their response to that knowledge; namely, a concerted disinformation
campaign abo an hropogenic disr p ion of he Ear h s clima e s s em
and its connection to fossil fuel use, coupled with an acceleration of their
businesses to further entrench societal dependence on fossil fuels.
Although there is a strong argument that such evidence would support a
federal nuisance claim, it would be a relatively novel claim. That is not
the case with state tort law, which is much better equipped to handle
259. See Minnesota Complaint, supra note 141, at 74 76 (failure to warn); Honolulu Complaint,
supra note 139, at 106 10 (failure to warn); Rhode Island Complaint, supra note 136, at 121 33
(design defec and fail re o arn); Fishermen s Complain , supra note 138, at 82 85, 88 89 (design
defect and failure to warn); San Mateo Complaint, supra note 149, at 81 87 (design defect and failure
to warn).
The ability to allege multiple claims in this way does not, of course, allow for multiple damage
awards; plaintiffs can recover only once for a given injury. But it does in many cases give plaintiffs
the opportunity to more fully describe and thus voice their opposition to conduct that they claim
has unlawfully harmed them.
260. See supra section II.A.
261. See supra section II.A.
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claims that allege liability for wrongful marketing of products.
Extension of theories of tort liability to deceptive marketing practices
is among the most important developments in the evolution of state tort
law in response to widespread public harms. Unlike federal common law,
this development of state tort law has only accelerated since Erie. In the
1960s, state courts throughout the nation began drawing on existing tort
law principles in response to new types of business activities by large
companies including mass-marketing of their products, engaging in
misleading marketing strategies, and selling unsafe products with the
potential to cause widespread and devastating harms. In so doing, state
courts have recognized that, in an era of corporate national marketing
campaigns that make representations of products essential to what
consumers perceive the products to be, tort law must be able to address
harms that are caused not by isolated instances of individual actions, but
rather from systematic activities of corporations. This is the sort of
conduct and harms that state courts have been addressing in their tort law
for over half a century now; federal courts applying the very limited
federal common law of nuisance have not.262 In this regard, the recent
clima e or claims based on he fossil f el ind s r s prod c
manufacturing and marketing are not novel for state tort law.
In sum, in contrast to the federal common law of nuisance which
developed to respond to the limited situation of interstate pollution
disputes state common law claims have increasingly been used to
mitigate the local consequences of corporate conduct that may have
widespread impacts throughout the rest of the nation, or indeed, the world.
It is unquestionably not the only, or even the best, way to address these
consequences. But it does not have to be in order to be justified or, indeed,
to be one essential means of addressing such problems. This is the second
reason that disallowing preemption of state tort law by federal common
law alone is the right result as a matter of policy, as explained the
next section.
B.

The Significance of State Tort Climate Litigation as Part of the
U.S. Legal Response to the Climate Crisis

State tort law has long provided a critical way in which individuals and
entities can hold others accountable for causing injury and secure redress
for those injuries. Particularly since the mid-twentieth century, individuals
and communities have sought compensation for harms caused by national
262. Relatedly, because state tort law is usually applicable and federal common law exceptional,
state judges have significantly more expertise with common law and its development than federal
judges do.
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and multinational for-profit entities whose widespread commercial
activities harm the health and well-being of humans and their
environment, usually when the political branches have left such activities
virtually unchecked. This makes it a particularly powerful tool for
communities who are most vulnerable to the harms caused by corporate
misconduct but who lack the sort of political or economic power that
might help them secure some measure of protection at the national level.
The pathbreaking litigation seeking redress for climate harms may prove
to be the most important example to date of this function of the tort system
at work.263
As noted above, the second-wave plaintiffs have strong evidence of the
fossil fuel industry defendants decep i e marke ing in their
complaints.264 If the cases get to discovery, there will undoubtedly be
f r her re ela ions abo he e en of defendan s kno ledge abo he
climate harms that the use of their products was causing and their
disinformation campaigns in response. Additionally, if allowed to
proceed, these cases will provide a much-needed governmental venue for
providing information about climate science. Such venues are particularly
essential now, when the Trump Administration is systematically
suppressing climate science and its implications265 across agencies,
including the EPA,266 Department of Interior,267 Department of
263. Cf. Douglas A. Kysar, What Climate Change Can Do About Tort Law, 41 ENV T L. 1, 71
(2011). ( Ideas abo . . . tort law must continually interact with the raw realities of human suffering
and with . . . institutions that address such suffering . . . . [S]uch a complex and contingent matrix
does not lend itself readily to prediction, but if scientists are even remotely correct in their assessment
of harms to be expected from greenhouse gas emissions, then climate change will enter prominently
in o or la s e ol ionar d namics. ).
264. See supra section II.A.
265. See generally, e.g., JACOB CARTER ET AL., THE STATE OF SCIENCE IN THE TRUMP
ADMINISTRATION: DAMAGES DONE, LESSONS LEARNED, AND A PATH TO PROGRESS 15 (2019)
( [T]he Tr mp administration has repeatedly ignored, dismissed, or suppressed the science of climate
change, limiting the ability of federal scientists to speak about, report on, or even study it. The
administration has also removed, revoked, and suppressed mentions of climate change in agency
documents and pointed instead to elements of uncertainty about the magnitude of impacts and the
human causes of climate change rather than the overwhelming U.S. and international consensus on
its very significant risks and the unequivocal evidence that recent warming is primarily caused by
h man ac i i ies. ).
266. See id. a 17 (s a ing ha [c]lima e science is . . . absent or has been removed from critical
science-based policies a he EPA, and pro iding e amples of his in r lemakings).
267. See Robbie Gramer, T
Shad
Wa
C i a e Scie ce, FOREIGN POL Y (July 31,
2019, 3:38 PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/07/31/trumps-shadow-war-on-climate-science-statedepartment-intelligence-analyst-resigns-white-house-muzzles-intelligence-assessment-climatechange-environment/ [https://perma.cc/Y6GC-X2Q7] (quoting a climate scientist who lost her
position a he Na ional Park Ser ice beca se she
as a clima e scien is in a clima e-denying
adminis ra ion, and repor ing ha a former senior official a he Depar men of In erior described a
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Agriculture,268 and State Department.269
The Tr mp Adminis ra ion s s s ema ic s ppression of clima e science
is part of the way it supports its efforts to dismantle the climate protections
that were in place and to justify its refusal to provide the much more
extensive protections that are necessary270 while accelerating approval
c l re of fear, censorship, and s ppression i hin he Tr mp adminis ra ion on clima e science,
and said ha s dies on he heal h impac s of coal mining and chemicals in drinking a er ha e been
m led or dela ed and he phrase clima e change s ripped from repor s ).
268. See Helena Bottemiller Evich, Agricultural Department Buries Studies Showing Dangers of
Climate Change, POLITICO (June 23, 2019, 5:04 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/06/
23/agriculture-department-climate-change-1376413 [https://perma.cc/XRN7-8JFB] (finding the
Tr mp Adminis ra ion s ppressed do ens of go ernmen -funded studies that carry warnings about
the effects of climate change, defying a longstanding practice of touting such findings by the
Agriculture Departmen s acclaimed in-ho se scien is s and hese findings re ealed a persis en
pattern in which the Trump administration refused to draw attention to findings that show the potential
dangers and consequences of climate change, covering dozens of separate studies. The
adminis ra ion s mo es flo decades of depar men prac ice of promo ing i s research in he spiri of
educating farmers and consumers around the world, according to an analysis of USDA
comm nica ions nder pre io s adminis ra ions ); Helena Bo emiller Evich, I Fee Like
Something Out of a Bad Sci-Fi M ie , POLITICO (Aug. 5, 2019, 5:14 AM),
https://www.politico.com/story/2019/08/05/ziska-usda-climate-agriculture-trump-1445271
[https://perma.cc/VU68-CW95] (Lewis Ziska, a leading climate scientist who authored one of those
studies one about how rice is losing nutrients because of rising CO2 levels resigned after the
Tr mp Adminis ra ion q es ioned his findings and ried o minimi e media co erage of he paper.
Ziska, who had worked at the USDA s Research Ser ice for o er en ears, old a Poli ico repor er
ha he a mosphere a he agenc had changed drama icall af er Tr mp s elec ion in 2016: An
[research] related to climate change was seen as extremely vulnerable. . . . No one wanted to say
clima e change, o o ld sa clima e ncer ain or o o ld sa e reme e en s. Or o o ld
se ha e er e phemism as a ailable o no dra a en ion. ).
269. See, e.g., Juliet Eilperin, Intelligence Aid, Blocked from Submitting Written Testimony on
Climate Change, Resigns from State Dept., WASH. POST (July 10, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/2019/07/10/intelligence-aide-blockedsubmitting-written-testimony-climate-change-resigns-state-department/?noredirect=on&utm_
campaign=Carbon%20Brief%20Daily%20Briefing&utm_medium=email&utm_source=Revue%20
newsletter&utm_term=.9d787aa7564b [https://perma.cc/A29N-NY69] (reporting the Trump
Adminis ra ion s ref sal o allo a State Department scientist to submit written testimony to the
House Intelligence Committee because the administration objected to statements about the national
sec ri hrea s presen ed b clima e change, incl ding: Absen e ensi e mi iga ing fac ors or
events, we see few plausible future scenarios where significant possibly catastrophic harm does not
arise from he compo nded effec s of clima e change ); Rod Schoono er, The White House Blocked
My Report on Climate Change and National Security, N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/30/opinion/trump-climate-change.html [https://perma.cc/5G5Q7N5H] (Explaining his decision to quit, he said: Science has long in ersec ed i h in elligence
analysis. . . . [T]he [adminis ra ion s] decision o block he ri en es imon is ano her example of a
well-established pattern in the Trump administration of undercutting evidence that contradicts its
policy positions. Beyond obstructing science, this action also undermined the analytic independence
of a major element of the intelligence community. When a White House can shape or suppress
intelligence analysis that it deems out of line with its political messaging, then the intelligence
community has no true analytic independence. I believe such acts weaken our nation. ).
270. See, e.g., STATE ENERGY & ENV T IMPACT CTR., N.Y.U. SCH. OF L., CLIMATE & HEALTH
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and construction of pipelines271 and increasing drilling on federal lands
and offshore.272 As this Article goes to press, the administration has
accelerated its destruction of vital environmental and public health
protections, by exploiting the coronavirus pandemic to abdicate its
responsibility to enforce basic environmental and public health
regulations governing the fossil fuel industry,273 to expedite oil and gas
lease sales and permitting of pipelines and on federal lands,274 to provide
the industry with relief from royalty payments that were already well

SHOWDOWN IN THE COURTS 3 4 (2019) (de ailing he Tr mp adminis ra ion s repeal or eakening
of si r les [ ha ] pro ide he larges and bes near-term opportunities to reduce climate pollution
from the highest contributors to greenhouse gas emissions: the power sector (coal-fired electric
generation); the transportation sector (cars and light trucks); the oil and gas sector; and the waste
sector (landfills) . . . . these sources and sectors are core drivers of U.S. contributions to global climate
change and, because of the legal obligation to reduce their emissions, they provide the most important
near-term opportunity to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and fight against climate change. And yet
the administration is doing the opposite, causing great harm to public health and the environment, as
recently laid out in the Fourth National Climate Assessment and highlighted throughout this report.
In shor , he Tr mp adminis ra ion is preparing o ake s o er he clima e cliff ).
271. See, e.g., Nicholas Kusnetz, Trump Aims to Speed Pipeline Projects by Limiting State
Environmental Reviews, INSIDECLIMATE NEWS (Apr. 11, 2019), https://insideclimatenews.org/
news/11042019/trump-pipeline-executive-order-environmental-review-keystone-xl-clean-water-actstates-rightsbra [https://perma.cc/8EKP-5Z8W] (reporting on two executive orders limiting
environmental reviews of pipelines).
272. John Schwartz, Major Climate Change Rules the Trump Administration is Reversing, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/29/climate/climate-rule-trumpreversing.html [https://perma.cc/UU3N-GD67].
273. See Oliver Milman & Emily Holden, Trump Administration Allows Companies to Break
Pollution Laws During Coronavirus Pandemic, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 27, 2020),
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2020/mar/27/trump-pollution-laws-epa-allowscompanies-pollute-without-penalty-during-coronavirus [https://perma.cc/84AC-48TM] ( In an
extraordinary move that has stunned former EPA officials, the Trump administration said it will not
e pec compliance i h he ro ine moni oring and repor ing of poll ion and on p rs e penal ies
for breaking these rules . . . There is no end da e se for his dropping of enforcemen . ). I bears
mention that the Trump Administration announced that it was lifting compliance obligations a week
after receiving a letter from the American Petroleum Institute, the industry trade association discussed
supra section III.B, making that very request. See Letter from Michael J. Sommers, President & Chief
Exec. Officer, API, to Donald J. Trump, President, U.S. (Mar. 20, 2020),
https://www.api.org/~/media/Files/News/Letters-Comments/2020/3202020-API-Letter-to-President
-Trump.pdf [https://perma.cc/JK4K-Z83Y] ( [T]he oil and natural gas industry needs to maintain safe
and reliable operations [during the pandemic], taking into consideration that there may be limited
personnel capacity to manage the full scope of the current regulatory requirements. As such, we will
be requesting assistance in temporarily waiving non-essential compliance obligations from the
rele an agencies and depar men s i hin o r Adminis ra ion and/or heir s a e co n erpar s. ).
274. See, e.g., Amy Westervelt & Emily Gertz, The Climate Rules Being Rolled Back During the
COVID-19 Pandemic, DRILLED NEWS (Apr. 6, 2020), https://www.drillednews.com/post/theclimate-covid-19-policy-tracker [https://perma.cc/WQJ8-TH6G] (documenting and mapping fossil
fuel-friendly changes being made by the Trump Administration during the pandemic, including
opening comment periods on pipeline projects and oil and gas leases).
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below market value for extraction on federal lands,275 and to urge
Congress to allocate billions in stimulus funding to bail out the industry
by purchasing near worthless oil for the Strategic Petroleum Reserve as
other storage sites have been filled.276
In such a situation, state tort law is one among many legal and policy
tools urgently needed to address the myriad climate harms exacerbated by
he federal go ernmen s ac ions and fail res o ac . This is he gap-filling
role that state tort law has been serving for this co n r s residents for
decades. In addition to redressing harms and deterring corporate
misconduct,277 or la can ser e o prod federal polic makers o ake
much-needed actions to protect those that they serve.278
The defendan s second-wave strategy of federalizing state tort law
threatens to cut off this vital avenue of redress and of corporate
accountability in the U.S. system at the time that we are facing the most
serious threats that we have ever faced. Now more than ever, state tort law
must be allowed to serve its long-standing functions that provide the
public with a safety net when federal protections are weak or non-existent.
CONCLUSION
In sum, the second-wave defense strategy of federalizing state tort law
is wrong-headed as a legal matter, and disastrous as a policy matter. All
law is going to have to deal with the climate crisis in order to be relevant,
whether it be international, national, or local. Tort law is a small but
important part of all state law in this country. The second-wave climate
275. See Heather Richards, BLM to Expedite Royalty Relief During Pandemic, E&E NEWS (Apr.
27, 2020), https://www.eenews.net/eenewspm/2020/04/27/stories/1062988129 (last visited Aug. 10,
2020) (repor ing on g idance iss ed b he B rea of Land Managemen enco rag[ing] prod cers
to apply for either a suspension of federal leases or a reduced royalty rate from the existing 12.5% of
fair marke al e ).
276. See Stephen Cunningham et al., Funding to Fill U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve Cut from
Stimulus Plan, WORLD OIL (Mar. 25, 2020), https://www.worldoil.com/news/2020/3/25/funding-torefill-us-strategic-petroleum-reserve-cut-from-stimulus-plan [https://perma.cc/SZ39-E77G]; Sam
Meredith, The Hunt for Oil Storage Space Is On He e H I Works and Why It Matters, CNBC
(Apr. 22, 2020, 3:07 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/22/oil-prices-heres-how-oil-storageworks-and-why-capacity-matters.html [https://perma.cc/44DW-26ZM].
277. Cf. David C. Vladeck, Preemption and Regulatory Failure, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 95, 126 27
(2005) ( Tor liabili ser es o impor an and rela ed f nc ions nser ed b reg la ion: or liabili
compensates those injured by products found to impose an unjustified risk, and, in so doing, it deters
excessive risk-taking by forcing the risk-taker to absorb the costs that come with marketing a product
ha imposes an nj s ifiable risk of harm. ).
278. Benjamin Ewing & Douglas A. Kysar, Prods and Pleas: Limited Government in an Era of
Unlimited Harm, 121 YALE L.J. 350, 423 (2011); Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut (AEP), 564
U.S. 410, 418 (2011) (noting the plaintiffs filed their claim in that case well before the EPA had
even recognized carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases as pollutants subject to regulation
under the CAA).
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tort suits are part of larger global movement of resorting to the courts to
demand climate justice that the IPCC presciently predicted over a decade
ago. The current era of climate disruption and its catastrophic threats
demand not only new and improved legal and policy mechanisms, but also
the use of current ones including state tort law to the fullest
extent possible.
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